( Source: kimwoojong )

Introduction

While the Korean public seems to lack any sense of urgency about it, raising Korea’s extremely low fertility rate looks set to become one of Korea’s most pressing economic issues in the next decade or so, and being able to witness events unfold as various vested interests contest the wrenching changes to Korean workplace culture, welfare, immigration policy and gender roles that will have to be made to do so is just one reason why the study of contemporary Korean society is so interesting.

Another is that developments here will to a greater or lesser extent be repeated in almost all developed countries a little later, generally with less dire figures at the moment but still well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman of reproductive age (see the graph below). Policymakers, academics and economists around the world will soon be paying much more attention to Korea for that reason, but for now, as always, Japan’s similar situation dominates international discourse, media-friendly stories about new robots designed to help care for Japan’s aging population probably serving more to exoticize and distance the issue more than draw attention to Western countries’ similar impending problems. Ironically, that will mean that the Korean government’s policy of doing too little too late will come to have even more relevance for them.

( Source. See here for tables )

Beginning with my own summary of the issue here, I wrote a glut of posts on this issue in the first few months of the blog. But after a certain point there’s only so many different aspects of the problem you can outline, and in the last, lame-duck year of what had already been a very incoherent and ineffectual Roh Moo-hyun Administration overall, few changes were going to be made to the central and local Korean governments’ inadequate, short-term and/or one-off cash incentives and tax-breaks for couples to have children too (see here for examples of those). But now six months after the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak, it’s high time to examine what changes have taken place under a new administration.

If you can forgive the brief aside for a moment, that’s partially to better understand the subject for its own sake, and to tie up some loose ends from those earlier posts, and partially because I plan to start discussing recent events and developments on the blog much more often in the future, albeit only those related to my niches of Korean gender issues, women and men’s body images, advertising, feminism, sexuality and so forth. I’ll wisely discuss that (slight) blogging-related change more at a later date; for now, lets just say that as I’m trying to make more posts more academically rigorous and defensible, then I’m finding that the research and writing for posts like this and this is starting to take weeks rather than days, and I still want to keep readers interested and entertained while I’m buried in my books.

But before I get to specific policy changes in later posts, first in this post I’ll discuss the following report on the economic effects of Korea’s low birth rate by Kim Woo-young in the Korea Herald. I chose it because It’s a good (re)-introduction to the topic for anyone unfamiliar with it, and coincidentally published on the same day that my second child was born, but on the other hand also because it’s so trite, reading as if all the instances of “Korea” in it could be replaced with almost any other developed country but still have just as much (ir)relevance to their situations. Korean society does have some very specific features that combine to make the its birthrate one of the lowest in the world, but either these are not given enough emphasis in the article or aren’t even mentioned at all, and so in an earlier draft of this post I was constantly linking to my earlier post to cover the gaps. Instead, let me just recommend that interested readers go on to read that in full after this.

Given that the notoriously user-unfriendly Korea Herald makes articles subscriber-only after a week or so too, then for the sake of providing a resource I’ll reproduce it here in full rather than give excerpts, adding my own comments as I go along.

( Source: Yume Love )

[KOREA`S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (7)] Declining fertility poses challenge to economy

(This is the 7th in a 20-part series analyzing major challenges to the Korean economy and suggesting mid- to long-term strategies to improve the economic fundamentals and the efficiency of economic policies. The articles, to be published once every week, are contributed by economists at the Bank of Korea`s Institute for Monetary & Economic Research. – Ed.)

In Korea, the total fertility rate – the average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime – continuously declined from the late 1950s to 2005. The TFR dropped from 4.53 in 1970 and 2.83 in 1980, then to 1.59 in 1990 and 1.08 in 2005. It rose slightly, to 1.13 and 1.26 in 2006 and 2007, respectively, boosted by the “Twin Spring Year” and the “Year of the Golden Pig.” It is uncertain, therefore, whether the latest trend will continue or revert to a decline.

As for why there was a boost in 2007, see here. That that was only a temporary blip was confirmed by the National Statistical Office on Thursday, which stated that “the number of newborn infants totaled 35,400 in June, down 1,800 or 4.8 percent from the same period a year earlier. In the first half, a total of 240,700 babies were born, compared with 244,400 a year before.” Meanwhile, the number of marriages is down 4.1% from the same period a year ago, and divorces up by 4.7% (reported in the Korea Herald, p.5, but strangely not posted to its website).

The fall in Korea`s fertility rate has been steeper than in other countries. It decreased by 3.45 from 1970 to 2005; it fell by 2.26 in the world as a whole during the same period. At the time, it fell by 0.87 in Japan, 0.41 in the United States and 0.63 in the United Kingdom.

In conjunction with economic development plans, Korea rigorously promoted a government-led birth control policy. Despite a birthrate below the ideal rate of 2.1 in 1983, the policy was maintained until 1996. In 2002, the problem of low fertility began attracting public attention. The government responded to the low TFR only after it dropped to the lowest level internationally. Accordingly, the government has been criticized for its sluggish response.

Statistics on the low Korean fertility rate abound, but all are essentially useless without reference to their sources, and providing those surely doesn’t seem to be too much to ask of a full-page report in a national newspaper? Moreover, once new policies to deal with low fertility begin to have greater financial impacts on individuals and companies (or even if existing legislation on maternity leave and so forth was actually enforced), then I imagine that greater statistical rigor will be required to defend both the evidence for their need and of their later successes, in much the same way that the climate-change “debate” has evolved.

Another similarity to climate-change politics is that there is an overwhelming consensus by both the government and academia that Korea’s demographic situation is dire and urgent action must be taken, but the former is unwilling to pay the political costs in imposing financial costs on the public to deal with them, particularly with Korea’s low tax, family-based, minimalist welfare system. That may sound rather cynical of me, but then consider the recent reactions around the world to increasing taxes on petrol/gasoline, essential if CO2-emission reduction targets are to be reached: it’s easy to be an environmentalist if it doesn’t involve any cost to you personally.

( Source: yusheng )

That slight tangent aside, the birth-control policy referred to above is known as the “Family Planning Program” (FPP), begun in 1962, and bringing the per capita rate of new births from 6.0 in 1960 to 1.6 in 1988. The article paints an inaccurate, excessively dogmatic picture of various governments’ adherence to it: while it did indeed officially end in1996, in practice it was “virtually extinct” in social discourse and government rhetoric by the 1980s, and no more official support for social programs aimed at lowering the birth rate was provided after 1988 (Kim: 352). Having said that, the FPP was somewhat more than providing leaflets on contraception at doctors’ clinics, probably the first image that comes to Western-readers’ minds: in fact, in its intrusiveness, ruthlessness and virtual state control of citizens’ reproductive lives, it was arguably outdone only by the infamous one-child policy of China. Lest you feel that that’s an exaggeration, then how else to describe a policy that at the height of the Cold War regularly withdrew forces from the DMZ to help deliver condoms, implant IUDs and perform (strongly encouraged) sterilizations on citizens living in rural areas and outlying islands?

I’ll cover the FPP in great detail in Part Five of this series next month. Before then though, a very overdue Part Three will be up in the next few days.

Women`s participation in the labor market and fertility rate

The female labor force participation rate in Korea – as a percentage of the population aged 15 and older, both employed and unemployed – increased from 39.3 percent in 1970 to 50.2 percent in 2007. In the same period, the men`s labor force participation rate decreased from 77.9 percent to 74.0 percent.

The increase in female workforce participation seems to be connected with the decline in the total fertility rate. The rise in labor force participation of women of childbearing age is notable. The labor force participation rate of those aged 25-29 increased markedly, from 32 percent in 1970 to 68 percent in 2007. Among those age 30-34, it also increased substantially, from 40.8 percent to 53.6 percent in the same period. Figure 1 shows that women`s labor force participation has a negative correlation with the fertility rate.

Not included in the version at the Korea Herald website, I took a picture of the accompanying graphs from the newspaper itself, forgetting that my wife’s computer problems meant that I couldn’t upload it sorry. Again then, a mention of the sources for them would have been nice.

Declining fertility rate

( Source: ThisParticularGreg )

A number of social, economic and psychological factors are attributed as the cause of the declining fertility rate. A decrease in the fertility rate can arise not only from a fall in the rate of married women giving birth but also from an increasing number of single women who don`t want to get married.

I didn’t understand that last point for quite a while, but now I take it to mean that because Koreans are so reluctant to have children out of wedlock (to put it mildly), then a decrease in the marriage rate would indeed result in a corresponding decrease in the fertility rate. By coincidence, yesterday I happened to come across a table of “2002 births to mothers aged 15-19 per 1000 women aged 15-19 in OECD countries” (Baker: 73), and Korea came dead last with 2.7, quite some distance from even Japan with 6.2. Not that that’s not a good thing, but it’s undoubtedly related. By comparison, Sweden had 6.9, France 11.4, Germany 13.2, New Zealand 14.0, Australia 18.4, Canada 21.9, the UK 28.6, the US 43.0, and finally Mexico topped the table with 51.1.

The average number of children born to married women declined from 4.1 in 1970 to 3.0 in 1990, and then to 2.4 in 2005. Also, women are having children later in life. The proportion of the 20-24 age group in the total number of women giving birth dropped from the mid-1980s onward, and that of the 25-29 age group also decreased from the late 1980s. However, the portion of women in their 30s giving birth began increasing in the mid-1980s. A decrease in childbearing by women in their 20s, even when coupled with a rate increase in among women in their 30s, usually leads to a reduction in childbirth due to health issues.

The decline in the total fertility rate outweighs that of the average number of children born to married women, since the number of married women has declined. Since the total fertility rate statistics include both married and single women, the decrease in the fertility rate becomes more significant because of the fall in the number of marriages and the decrease in the average number of children born to married women.

Anybody else not quite understand that last paragraph?

The proportion of married women in the 20-24 age group decreased from 42.8 percent in 1970 to 6.3 percent in 2005. In the same period, the number of married women aged 25-29 declined from 90.3 percent to 40.9 percent. Among those aged 30-34, it dropped from 98.6 percent to 81.0 percent. Meanwhile, the mean age of first-time brides verifies that women are delaying marriage, as the age increased from 24.8 years in 1990 to 27.8 years in 2006. Many single women postpone marriage as they extend their education and become financially independent.

( Source: Sinfest )

We can categorize the main factors in the decline of the fertility rate of married women into economic reasons, changes in family values and social factors. According to a survey by the Chungnam Women`s Policy Development (published in January 2006), the reasons why married women avoid childbirth are the impediments to their social activities imposed by childbirth and child care, the need for freedom in their lives, the cost of children’s education, and difficulties in family circumstances.

As for the economic factors, the costs of child rearing and of education are the ones most mentioned. According to a family income survey by the National Statistical Office for urban households with more than two family members, the share of educational expenses in average monthly consumption expenditures rose from 7.7 percent in the 1981 to 12 percent in 2007. The proportion of income that goes into food, however, declined from 51.5 percent in 1981 to 25.1 percent in 2007.

These are amongst some of the paragraphs that most bugged me. Nothing in them is incorrect per se, but could be applicable to any country because of sloppy wording. Obviously the cost of children’s education would be the most mentioned factor, more important in Korea than in most other countries, and if that’s not obvious, then see this post. Which is precisely my point: it’s not unreasonable for readers to assume that “the cost of children’s education” means buying supplies and so forth like in, say, New Zealand, but in fact it almost exclusively means the cost of going to after-school institutes.

If you can get a hold of it, I highly recommend reading Jae-Kyung Lee’s chapter “The Social Construction and Contradiction in the Mothering of Working Class Women” in Feminist Cultural Politics in Korea, for an interesting discussion of the precise costs involved. Based on interviews of working-class women in Bucheon and Incheon (industrial cities close to Seoul) in April 2003, it’s amazing to see how central their children’s education at after-school institutes is to their lives, despite taking up quite an considerable part of their family’s meager incomes.

Job insecurity and low income have become one of the primary reasons for not having children. The increasing number of temporary workers has caused job security to deteriorate, while the wages of temporary and casual workers are lower than those of permanent workers. Temporary workers made up 30.4 percent of male workers and 42.7 percent of female workers in 2006. The wages of temporary workers are only 62.8 percent of those of permanent workers.

Again quite true, but needing more elaboration and emphasis. Although again the above statistics are somewhat meaningless, and I’ll be investigating figures from various sources in Part Four of this series soon (Part Three up next week), Korea went from having the most, male-breadwinner jobs-for-life in the OECD (those where the man’s income and frequent side benefits were sufficient to support a nuclear family) in 1997 to the least in 2007, something that has fundamentally changed Korean working life and family life.

It is well-known that when a female temporary worker wants maternity leave, she is very likely to be given notice of dismissal. The 2007 payment status of maternity protection benefits shows that only 66 temporary workers out of a total of 58,000 female workers took maternity leave. This reveals that female temporary workers have difficulties in getting maternity leave. For example, one company upgraded the temporary status of female workers to permanent status in 2007. After obtaining permanent employment status, their applications for maternity leave increased dramatically. Thus, employment security does seem to have a positive effect on decisions about whether or not to have children.

Rather than continuing to make trite, overly generalized points about educated women having less babies, the “double burden” and more meaningless statistics, to put it mildly the author should have elaborated that first point much more. He makes it sound positively normal, whereas surely the effects of minor things like the complete non-enforcement of legislation on Korea’s fertility rate make all other factors pale in comparison?

It also reminds me that, even before I read that, I found that the overall tone of this piece was to present fertility decline is presented as almost some inexorable force of nature inherent to modernization, ignoring both the huge differences that a country’s ranking on the Gender Empowerment Measure makes – there is a huge difference in fertility rates between Northern and Southern Europe for instance, proving that women’s levels of political and economic empowerment are more crucial than “previous statistical association[s] between high fertility, Catholicism, and traditional family values” (Baker: 71) – and the fact that in many other developed countries, where trivial things like maternity leave legislation is actually enforced, then the decline in the fertility rate has been slowed or even reversed.

Changes in family values also seem to affect childbirth. According to the 2005 National Survey of Marriage and Birth Rates, 35 percent of married woman said that they have no plans to have children. Some 17.5 percent of single men and 26.2 percent of single women expressed their intention to remain single. Half of single women 35 or older did not want to get married for many reasons, including the burden of child rearing. The results reflect sweeping changes in family values.

( Source: yusheng )

A social atmosphere in which work and household management are incompatible is also cited by many women. Despite the increase in women`s economic participation, women are required to take responsibility for household chores and childcare. In addition, a return to work after giving birth is not guaranteed, and women therefore have difficulties in deciding whether to have children. According to the study “The Low Fertility Situation and Responses” published in March 2006 by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, more than half of working women experienced difficulties in maintaining their working career with pregnancy and in returning to work after giving birth. A shortage in childcare facilities that parents can trust also inhibits married women from having children. While the total number of childcare facilities increased from 9,085 to 28,367 between 1995-2005, that of government-established and public nursery facilities rose only slightly – from 1,092 to 1,473. It is clear that the government needs to better support the child care sector.

Again, “a shortage in childcare facilities that parents can trust” begs some questions, and understates the problem. In my earlier post, I discuss that in more detail, mentioning the regularity with which reports of kindergarten students becoming ill after being fed bad food appear in the Korean media, and the fact that the relevant ministries are so understaffed that they can rarely if ever make inspections of facilities.

For more specific information on numbers of childcare facilities, see pp.19-20 of the Word Document the following link will open: http://www.utoronto.ca/ai/canada-korea/papers/Yeong-RanPark_FamilyPolicy.doc.

Demographic changes

As the fertility rate has decreased, population growth has also slowed, and the population is expected to start declining in 2019. Population growth, which stood at 3.01 percent in 1961 and 2.21 percent in 1970, dropped to only 0.33 percent by 2007.

According to population projections by the National Statistical Office, the population growth rate will fall to -1.71 percent by 2050. However, the development of medical technology has greatly-extended life expectancy – from 62 years in 1970 to 79 in 2006.

The decline in the fertility rate and the increase in life expectancy have accelerated the aging of Korean society. The percentage of the population aged 65 and older increased from 3.1 percent in 1970 to 9.9 percent in 2007. Korea has already become an aging society, with 7 percent or more of its population 65 and older in 2000, and is expected to become an aged society (with 14 percent or more at 65 and older) in 2018. Korea is also forecast to become a super-aged society (with 20 percent of its population at 65 or older) by 2026.

The percentage of the population age 14 or younger fell from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 2007, and is anticipated to decline further to 8.9 percent in 2050. The proportion of the so-called “productive population,” aged 15 to 64, is predicted to shrink from 72 percent in 2007 to 53 percent by 2050.

The changing population structure has a number of effects on the economy. Representative effects can, for example, include a drop in labor supply and an increase in the burden of supporting older people.

Growth in the number of productive population has declined continuously, and this may lead to a labor supply shortage. The productive population grew by 3.44 percent in 1970, but this rate has since dropped to 0.57 percent in 2007 and is forecast to begin to decline from 2018. The percentage of middle-aged workers in the economically active population is meanwhile likely to increase, and a disparity between supply and demand by age group is therefore also anticipated.

Solutions

Is it a proper solution for Korea to raise the fertility rate to prevent the population from declining further? Let us suppose that the decline in the fertility rate, and the aging of society, which we are now experiencing, is a procedure for adjusting the population to its optimal level. If, after adjusting our population to its appropriate level, we can maintain an optimal fertility rate level, population decline will not be a big problem in the long run. If the fertility rate remains too low, however, even after the appropriate adjustment, this can impact on the economy.

Looking at the Korean economy, we observe that the production structure has, since the early 1990s, changed into one that is less labor intensive. While the number of employees increased at an average annual rate of 4 percent until the early 1990s, it has dropped to 1 percent level since the start of this decade. The ratio of employment to GDP – the number of workers needed per 1 billion won of GDP – decreased from 47 in the 1990s to 35 in the 2000s, a phenomenon attributable to increased labor productivity. The improvement in labor productivity means labor demand is sluggish or even declines if the economy does not continually expand.

( Source: DarkRoastedBlend )

Examining this in more detail, we can see in Figure 4 that the ratio of employment to GDP has fallen over the years. Most notably, in the manufacturing sector it plunged drastically from 253 in 1970 to 18 in 2006. In the case of the service industry, in contrast, it dropped from 74 in 1970 to 41 in 2006. The reduction of the employment to GDP ratio in the service sector was less than that of the manufacturing industry. Despite the increasing employment in the service sector, by absorbing labor force from the manufacturing sector, a large part of service facilities still remained relatively small and its activity was restricted only to the domestic market.

Looking at the production structure of the manufacturing industry until 1991, output in the labor-intensive industries surpassed that in the capital-intensive industries. Since 1992, however, output in capital-intensive industries has exceeded that of the labor-intensive ones. Although total manufacturing sector employment began to decline from 1992, total sector output has constantly increased, meaning “growth without employment.”

Thanks to technological development, labor productivity in Korea is forecast to continuously improve. If the labor productivity in the service sector is improved, overall labor demand is likely to fall in the future. A reduction in the labor supply is thus necessary to a certain extent. If the labor supply shrinks at a faster pace than labor demand, we resolve the problem by raising the labor force participation rate, which as of 2007 was 74 percent among men and 50 percent among women.

Is labor productivity in Korea indeed “forecast to continuously improve”? By whom? Given that Koreans work some of the longest hours in the world, but have extremely low productivity, then any statements like that need to be taken with a grain of salt. In practice, while Koreans do indeed spend a great deal of time physically present at their workplaces, and have a much-exaggerated reputation for hard work as a result, this is merely a vestige of the work mentality of Korea’s previously secure jobs-for-life, where contracts were meaningless and ambitious employees could not be seen to leave before the boss did, regardless of how little work they actually had to do. Hence the extra hours that supposedly lazier Westerners don’t work are often spent simply napping or chatting on the internet instead, as can be confirmed by visiting virtually any Korean white-collar company after lunchtime.

( “Labor compensation per employee, total economy, Average annual growth in percentage, 1995-2006 or latest available period”. Source: Left Flank )

For more on that, read here and here. Needless to say, only being at work from 9-5 would both raise Korea’s labor productivity and make raising children much easier. Certainly that would still not quite be enough, as things like Western companies’ recent moves to flexitime systems demonstrate, but the shift would trigger a veritable social revolution in Korea.

As the population is aging, the number of the elderly whom the productive population needs to support has increased. Between 1970 and 2007, the dependency ratio more than doubled from 5.7 percent to 13.8 percent. In other words, the number of people aged over 65 has increased from 6 to 14 per 100 productive people. That means a tremendous increase in the burden on the productive population.

The rapidly aging society does not only cause increasing financial burden, however. It has positive effects on the economy at the same time. In Switzerland, for example, according to research by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grandparents spend 100 million hours per year taking care of their grandchildren, and the economic value of this amounts to $1.9 billion. The elderly help create jobs such as patient care assistants in the service sector.

The elderly have played a role in promoting women`s labor force participation and thereby in raising married women`s fertility rate. The elderly has taken on the household chores and child care, and in this context the aging population has made some contributions to Korea`s economy.

Well, yes, and New Scientist magazine has noticed a strong positive correlation between the proximity of grandparents and the number of children a couple has, and there is strong evidence that menopause evolved at least partially to free women to be good grandmothers too, but the article ignores the fact that, these days, Korean grandparents are increasingly reluctant to spend their retirements taking care of grandchildren (virtually every book I have on that generation of Koreans mentions that). There are indeed still many “weekend parents” in Korea (similar to “weekend couples”), forced by inadequate childcare options to sometimes drive their children to their grandparents’ houses M-F and only seeing their children on weekends, but that mindset shift of grandparents means that they are less and less common. Besides, they were always measures of last resort, and the many accounts of heartbroken, crying mothers on the drive back home every Sunday night that I’ve read demonstrate that they were hardly a natural, “Neo-Confucian” feature of East Asian societies anayway. But with even that fallback option removed then now there’s even more excuse for couples to have less or no children.

Policy suggestions

The economy is an organism, and we might want to allow the fertility rate to adjust naturally, to maintain our population at the optimal level. The fertility rate which remains very low, however, is undesirable, as it could increase population volatility. The government should therefore conduct a policy to raise the fertility rate to prevent the population from shrinking rapidly.

Given that many avoid marriage because of the financial burdens of childbirth and childcare, policy measures are required to boost childbirth among married women and encourage single women to get married.

Local governments have introduced policies to encourage childbearing such as cash benefits a short period of time after childbirth. The effects of the policy may be limited, however, and we need to develop policies which will have long-lasting effects. The central government has pursued a number of policy options, including the revision of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, the childbirth credit system for pension funds, and taxation reform. Such policies will need to be strengthened and promoted constantly.

The aging population and the rising financial burden have become a reality. If we deploy measures to help the elderly contribute to the economy, however, we may be able to prevent the financial burden on the younger generation from growing too heavy.

As always, a much longer post than intended! In not this post but the next, I’ll cover childbirth in Korea itself, discussing how notions of modernization and Korean women’s body images have combined to lead to high incidences of such things as high rates of unnecessary Cesarean sections here and even of pregnant women dieting. Neither are confined to only Korean women by any means, but given everything else I’ve said about Korean women’s body images and so forth, then I do strongly expect that my research for it will show that both will be much more common than in Western countries.

____

Baker, Maureen Choices and Constraints in Family Life, 2007.

Kim, Eun-shil,  “Women and the Culture Surrounding Childbirth”, in Korean Anthropology: Contemporary Korean Culture in Flux, Anthology of Korean Studies Volume III, ed. By Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2003), pp. 343-371. Originally in Korea Journal, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997), downloadable here.

(Celebrity mother Byun Jung-soo (변정수), posing in July 2005 and then July 2006. Source)

I’ve been reading a lot about Korean modernization recently, and it’s been interesting to see how the few feminist sources on that uniformly emphasize the sociological themes of the nuclearization of the family and “housewifization” involved in the process that “traditional” accounts lack. Related are the adoption of rational, Western models of health-care and mothering as symbols of that modernity too, and hence I came to be reading the following description of becoming a mother in Korea in the very same week that my second daughter suddenly arrived:

“Women experience acute conflicts and tensions in accepting their new, post-birth identities. Especially amongst the younger women [interviewed], the “mother” identity conflicts severely with their identities as an independent, self-reliant professional woman, or as a lover or wife of a young husband. Moreover, in the 1990s, mass media touts images of beauty, youthfulness and competence; this discourse on femininity, which implies that women should continue to be “feminine, slim, and competent,” makes it much more difficult for them to accept the physical and social changes accompanying childbirth. Therefore, women exert tremendous efforts to lose the extra pounds they put on during pregnancy, and some, concerned with their body shape after delivery, even diet during pregnancy. Some choose to bottle-feed their babies instead of breast-feeding simply because they want to go on a diet immediately following delivery. Also, some young women commented that they suffered from post-partum depression, which resulted in part from their own conflicts with their changed status.

(Kim, 1997: 363. My emphasis)

Of course, the first half of the paragraph is applicable to virtually any new mother in any developed society, whereas the part that I’ve emphasized is probably most common in Korea and East Asia. But however perverse it sounds, in a sense it’s a logical conclusion to the excessive emphasis that Korean women tend to place on their body images, demonstrated by the fact that, for instance, while Korean women in their twenties are the slimmest in the OECD they actually consider themselves to be the most obese personally (reference to be added over my coffee tomorrow morning; for now, see here). With plenty more factoids like that to offer based on my research on Korean women’s body images, then personally I’m not at all fazed by this new information (new to me that is), and have a gut instinct that the statement is equally if not more applicable of Korean mothers today than when it was first written.

(Update: For an interesting, more down-to-earth description of becoming a mother in Korea, see here)

(In March 2007. Source)

But let’s examine this “gut instinct” of mine for a moment. Certainly I think I’ve earned the right to able to make judgments on the validity of any statements made about Korean women’s body images, and that revelation of Kim’s is very much in line with what I already know about them. But then I’m only just beginning to scratch the surface of mothering in Korea specifically, and have no research of my own to back that up. Unfortunately, Kim provided no evidence for her assertion either.

Was it absolutely necessary for her to do so? Certainly in a thirty page article in an academic journal not every point needs to be religiously referenced, particularly if it is considered common-sense and/or an article of faith by readers, generally specialized academics already very familiar with the topic. Nor does a lack of evidence by any means imply fabrication either.

But the more I study the topic of Korean women’s body images, the more I become aware of what I previously regarded as common-sense for the subject may sometimes be little more than preconceptions on my part. Take what I regard (update — formerly regarded: see here, here, and here!) as Korean women’s Caucasian body ideals for instance. While there is much more basis to my belief in those than the fact that it is extremely rare to see a Korean rather than a Caucasian model in lingerie advertisements (see here for a summation of them), it’s also true that those advertisements were certainly the most visible and glaring piece of evidence in favor of them: turn on a Korean TV, open a Korean women’s magazine, or simply wait for a bus, and one is soon bombarded with images of Caucasians. Hell, of course Koreans place them on a pedestal.

(Source)

But at the very least, the recent revelations that Korean models merely disdain lingerie modeling as “beneath them” (update — in hindsight, things were a little more complicated than that; see here for more details) demonstrates that things are more nuanced than they may at first appear, and cross-country comparisons (see here and here) of the number of Caucasians in Korean advertisements need to be reexamined in the light of this new information: would the numbers of Caucasians drop dramatically if lingerie advertisements were excluded? More pointedly, did they lead me to see inferiority complexes and racial motivations in other aspects of Korean women’s body images where none actually existed?

Naturally I don’t think so, but it’s good to remember that what passes as common-sense is really very specific to cultures, periods, individuals and their agendas, as I’m sure any expat in Korea is fully aware. The author of this recent post on the bodies of young Chinese gymnasts at Feministing, for instance, quotes a study that finds 46% of American women to naturally have “rectangular” body shapes, whereas to me (and this commentator) that figure is simply absurd. But the otherwise excellent quality of that post also leads me to believe that the author didn’t simply pick and choose a source which best supports her arguments; rather, she genuinely believes that most American women generally do not have the curvy, hourglass figures that have been so venerated historically, and both our notions of common-sense just so happen to support our different takes on that (see here and here for mine).

Hence, what one author or groups of authors regards as common sense always needs to be challenged. To me, the classic experiments of Harry Harlow reveal this truism best.

(Source: fotos.rotas)

Back in the 1950s and 60s, it was generally believed by the scientific community that rats were just as effective experimental subjects as primates for learning about human behavior, a position that just so happened to be much cheaper and convenient for researchers too. It was also believed that there was absolutely no basis to the idea that children with bad parents would be more likely to be bad parents themselves either. To prove the former wrong in particular, Harlow conducted:

…a series of experiments on mother-child bonding in rhesus monkeys. With hindsight, many of Harlow’s tests seem quite hideous. In order to demonstrate that it was comfort rather than food alone that baby monkeys sought from their mothers, he created a pair of monstrous models: cloth mother and wire mother. Cloth mother was soft and cosy. Wire mother was hard and uncomfortable, but delivered milk. No prizes for guessing which one the babies preferred to cling to. Some mothers were even worse. In order to investigate maternal rejection, brass-spike mother, air-blast mother and others like them were brought into play. Harlow had no time for the euphemisms which, even today, are used to soften the descriptions of experimental procedures in scientific papers. The apparatus he devised to impregnate females whose courtship skills had been destroyed by their sterile upbringing was known as the rape rack. The inverted pyramid used to impose isolation, in order to investigate the origins of depression, was the pit of despair.

The results were exactly what you might have expected. Children need mother love. Upbringing matters. Females who are neglected as children go on to neglect their own children. But Harlow’s experiments were needed to convince the experts of this self-evident truth. And those experts held sway over the child-rearing practices of the day. Monkeys had to suffer so that children might not. The University of Wisconsin’s psychology department was nicknamed “Goon Park” because its address, 600 N. Park, could read that way on carelessly addressed letters. As a comment on crude behaviorism, though, the name could not be bettered.

(“The Goon Show”, The Economist, Jan 23rd 2003. My emphasis)

Unfortunately, any “choice” of English-language sources to use on Korean sociology is usually a choice between finding the one source you’ve found and…well…not using any at all, but it’s still something to be aware of. This led me to look much more critically at a 2001 article from the Los Angeles Times on the popularity of caesarean sections in Korea (the best I could find by googling) than I would have previously, and as a result I’m surprised to say that South Korea seems to have received an undeserved bad press for its supposedly high rates compared to Western countries. Some excerpts from it:

(Source: butejin)

Labors of a Caesarean Culture

By Mark Magnier, April 19, 2001.

…

Proportionately, South Korea performs more caesareans than any other nation, with 43% of its babies entering the world under the knife, compared with 20% in the United States. Public health experts say many Koreans, awed by modern Western medicine, believe that caesarean deliveries are safer than natural births.

…

But more than simple misperception appears to be driving up the caesarean numbers. Until recently, doctors and hospitals earned three times more, or $1,490, for a caesarean birth than for a natural one. Add in longer hospital stays, and the fees jumped as high as $8,000.

“The major blame should go to the doctors,” says Kim Ki Young, deputy research manager with South Korea’s National Health Insurance Corp. “They’re always urging women and frightening them in order to boost their fees.”

Doctors, however, cite factors other than profit, including a legal system that absolves physicians of most liability in the case of caesarean births but leaves them vulnerable when accidents occur during natural ones.

Women often report being told weeks in advance that they will need a caesarean, even though medical literature suggests that the procedure should be a last resort generally decided on in the delivery room after signs of trouble appear.

Another factor in the incredibly high levels, public health officials say, is convenience. Doctors prefer to handle births during regular office hours rather than see their schedules upset by a long labor that lasts late into the night.

…

South Korean public health officials say the 43% figure is so high that they have been reluctant to report it to international research organizations. Recently, in an effort to reverse the trend, the government insurance corporation-part of a universal system funded by company and employee premiums-has dramatically reduced its reimbursement schedule for a caesarean, although the operation still generates more income for doctors than does a natural birth.

…

But the most common argument is the different ways the two procedures are treated in court. Under the assumption that a birth requiring a caesarean must be problematic by definition, the law saddles doctors performing caesareans with much less liability than in cases of natural birth. The fact that the law spurs more caesareans was an unintended consequence.

“The courts are always finding doctors guilty, so it’s common sense they try and avoid natural childbirth,” says Park Moon Il, professor of obstetrics at Seoul’s Hanyang University.

The number of childbirth malpractice suits in South Korea remains tiny by U.S. standards-49 for the entire country in 1999 out of 616,000 births. But the Health Ministry plans to submit legal changes to the National Assembly this year that would equalize liability in caesarean and natural births.

Not all the blame, however, can be placed on doctors’ shoulders. Women also play a role for some very unscientific reasons. One commonly held belief in Korean society is that women who undergo caesareans will be thinner and physically more attractive than those who give birth naturally. Another holds that the sex life of women who undergo caesareans will be better than that of their natural-birth peers because the birth canal will not have been distended.

Also prevalent in South Korea’s education-obsessed society is the view that squeezing the baby’s head through the birth canal risks dulling the child’s intelligence, ultimately hurting the youngster’s chances of getting into a prestigious university.

“The important thing is to eradicate these myths,” says Kim Sang Hee, director of WomenLink, a South Korean nonprofit group.

Saju, Korea’s art of numerology derived from ancient Chinese practices, is another culprit. Superstitious mothers-to-be visit saju masters for advice on the best days to give birth to children who will be healthy, wealthy and wise. Armed with the input, they request caesareans.

…

The publicity has resulted in more women questioning doctors when told that they need a caesarean. “I can see a change taking place among medical consumers and future mothers,” says Chung Hee Kyung, a senior reporter of the Women’s News, a weekly newspaper. Still, most believe that it could take many years before a fundamental shift in the culture is visible.

Medical experts say part of the sharp rise in the caesarean rate stems from South Korea’s greater affluence over the last few decades, during which its society enthusiastically embraced Western medicine. Only now is the pendulum swinging back as Koreans rediscover the benefits of midwives and other long-standing medical traditions.

…

I was tempted to cut and paste the entire article, but the length prevented that. Instead, I chose to highlight both the unique elements to South Korea’s birth culture it mentions and those which are actually just as applicable to virtually any modern medical system too. But perhaps this American cartoon puts it best:

(Source)

But while interesting, figures in newspaper reports without reference to sources are next to useless really, something I’ve begun to repeatedly emphasize on the blog recently (sorry). This blog post providing a summary of different countries’ rates of Caesarean births doesn’t provide them either unfortunately, but does demonstrate that the figures for South Korea, while excessive, are not particularly higher or lower than in many other countries. Paradoxically, that’s still relevant despite the lack of sources, because while the author of that may well have had at least a subconscious desire to exaggerate and/or select sources which gave high rates, there’s no reason to suggest that in a blog not at all related to Korea that those of Korea in particular were done so more than any other countries mentioned.

Moreover, one author that does mention her sources, albeit to books which I’m not going to dogmatically link to the Amazon pages of here, is Maureen Baker (2007), and the excerpts from her book below demonstrate that South Korea practices are by no means exceptional:

…

Rates of Caesarean deliveries vary by the age, social class, and ethnicity of the mother, with older, wealthier, and ‘European’ or ‘white’ women more likely to experience such deliveries in Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand (Baker:83).

Considerable controversy exists over [the rising rate] of Caesarian births, which are increasing partly because women are having their first baby later in life and medical practitioners tend to define these births as ‘high risk’ Doctors and nurses view childbirth as risky if women are over age of 35…

Doctors use Caesarean deliveries to limit the risks of vaginal birth but also to reduce their potential legal liability if the birth becomes complicated. However, Caesareans also can be conveniently scheduled in advance and command higher fees because they require more medical expertise.

…

Some older and wealthier women may ask their doctors for a Caesarean delivery because they are encouraged to believe that they are safer, but also because they can be scheduled in advance. Some journalists have suggested that a few women are convinced that [they] provide aesthetic and sexual benefits over vaginal births (i.e., an abdominal scar is seen as a lesser disadvantage than a ‘loose vagina’ from vaginal birth that may impede sexual satisfaction (Baker: 84).

…

The steadily increasing rate of Caesarean births over the last century has become one of the most contested issues in maternity care. The WHO…suggests that the optimum rate should fall between 5 and 15%….however, in some regions of a number of countries, rates range from 25 to 45% of all births.

…

If a doctor cautions a pregnant woman that vaginal birth could be risky for her, few patients would have the means of evaluating this medical advice and most would be likely to accept [it]. Doctors, as well as pregnant women and their families, do not want to take unnecessary risks in childbirth.

I’m not suggesting for a moment that Mark Magnier, the author of the Los Angeles Times article, lied or exaggerated in his article, but I do suspect that only one source was used for the figures in it. Had more been, then I suspect that the (more accurate) article would never have made it into print, reporters – and bloggers – tending to emphasize the differences between the culture examined and that of the majority of readers, and hence a title along the lines of “Korean Rates of Caesarean Births About the Same as Most Western Countries” not quite being eye-catching to readers. On the other hand, the fact that Caesarean deliveries are usually performed unnecessarily overseas too doesn’t somehow render the same in Korea more acceptable somehow, and I recommend reading the owner of the blog Ranting of An Englishman’s account of the recent birth of his child for a personal negative experience of it here.

p.s. In hindsight, this post may have given the impression that my wife just had a Caesarean, and/or that I don’t have any problems with them. Quite the opposite, on both counts!

____

Baker, Maureen, Choices and Constraints in Family Life, Oxford University Press, 2007.

Kim, Eun-shil,  “Women and the Culture Surrounding Childbirth”, in Korean Anthropology: Contemporary Korean Culture in Flux, Anthology of Korean Studies Volume III, ed. By Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2003), pp. 343-371. Originally in Korea Journal, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997), downloadable here.

( Source: I Believe in Advertising )

Not technically Korean sorry, and surely the advertisement in Italian women’s magazine Grazia would have been much more effective in things both sexes read? Still, it’s definitely creative, and as you can see from this graph below (source), its message would be just as relevant to Korean readers:

Actually I’m surprised that that figure for Korea is so high, regularly hearing that Korea has the lowest rate in the OECD, and which given the high numbers of Koreans in tertiary education and the low wages in the types of jobs open to young women (and men), both of which will only be exacerbated by the current financial crisis, it may still well be if the age range is extended from 25-54 to 15-64. Regardless, it’s very low, and while I’ve written a great deal on the blog over the last two years as to the reasons why (see here and here for starters), a picture really does say a thousand words.

Or more graphs to be precise, the next one below (source) clearly showing Korea’s sharp “M-shaped curve” of women’s labor force participation, the result of women entering the labor force after finishing their schooling, then leaving in droves as they find it impossible to juggle children and work, then returning gradually once the children reach school age, finally to leave again as they retire. This is in contrast to the “upside-down U-curve”  of – let’s face it – more enlightened countries (at least when it comes to the position of women), and the “n-curve” for men, which is usefully included as a comparison:

Unfortunately I couldn’t find an online graph showing how Korea’s women’s labor force participation rate has changed over time, but I do have the figures below from page 24 of Working Korea 2007 published by the Korea Labor & Society Institute, which you can compare to the rates of some other countries through these graphs that I could find (source), luckily for the same age range of 15-64:

• 1980: 38.2%
• 1980-84: 38.6%
• 1985-89: 40.0%
• 1990-94: 40.%
• 1995-99: 41.5%

In this case, Korea’s figures most resemble Mexico’s I guess. For the sake of future reference, here are some more recent, albeit depressingly similar figures:

• 2005: 41.7%
• 2006: 41.9%

Being so…er…ripe for it, then ideally this or a similar ad will also appear in Korea sometime soon; either way, I’m sorry if in the past I’ve sounded a little like a stuck record, so regularly lamenting the low position of women in Korea and all, but hopefully all of the above has provided a stark demonstration as to why I have the focus on the blog that I do!

( Source left: unknown; Source right: GR × HERMARK )

Well, angry Chinese men to be precise, for in 2005 there were 32 million more Chinese boys under the age of 20 than girls, some of the oldest of which will already have been having problems finding sexual partners. And the the gap is set to get worse over the next twenty years as the demographic “wave” of China’s skewed sex ratio arrives.

That figure comes from this study released last week, according to the New York Times actually the first ever to provide hard data on the scale of the problems coming as a result of China’s “One Child Policy“, so it’s well worth a quick read (it’s only seven pages long).

Certainly the notion of hordes of sexually frustrated young men haunting Shanghai bars may sound facetious at first (aren’t they there already?), but the reality is that throughout history they’ve invariably proved very bad for social stability and security: much better to send them off fighting wars, so they don’t cause trouble back at home. Which, needless to say, is ultimately very ominous-sounding considering the ugly nationalist streak China has been displaying in recent years, particularly by its young people. For more on that, see this excellent article by Michael Ledeen (with thanks to Tom Coyner’s “Korean Economic Reader” mailing list), who argues partially on that basis that it is quite misleading and outdated to think of China as a communist regime, and that it is actually more a fascist one now. He’s very convincing.

Meanwhile, see here for my take on Korea’s own sex-ratio problems, which – despite what you may read elsewhere – were actually acknowledged and largely taken care of back in the mid-1990s. Unfortunately however, that minor detail tends to get overlooked by the overseas media somehow.

Finally, not that it really has anything to do with this post, but I confess that it inspired the title: if you haven’t heard of the Angry Asian Man blog then be sure to check it out, as it offers an unorthodox (and much needed) perspective on American culture and politics.

With apologies to the authors of the blog Sociological Images for copying both the name and the idea, but then my own images will be few and far between, and naturally confined to only Korean examples! Besides, if the quality of the images on this blog didn’t already give it away then I’ve aleady been a fan of modern Korean art and photography for quite a while now, and have long lamented that the academic in me rebels against posting images just for the sake of it, no matter how well they might embody, say, a certain Korean zeitgeist or -  my personal favorite – provide interesting juxtapositions.

Which may seem a bit rich to describe my first choice of this image (source) of Son Tae-young (손태영) from her appearance at the SBS Broadcasting center in Seoul yesterday, promoting her new drama Two Wives (두아내) that is due to air on May the 4th, but there are indeed *cough* two points to this image which make it – in the words of the about page of SI – “compelling and timely,” albeit both of which I’ve already discussed in depth and so will be simply linking to here.

The first, of course, is the fact that her bra is clearly visible, without which her appearance at the promotion undoubtedly wouldn’t have generated quite the attention in the Korean media and blogosphere that it has (see here, here, and here for the latter). Why that is significant in anything other than a voyeuristic sense is that – as far as I know – she is the first Korean celebrity to dress in that fashion, and, as I explain here, here, and especially here, Western celebrities doing so several years ago heralded big changes in fashions and notions of “appropriate” standards of dress for women here. Perhaps Son Tae-young will prove to be an icon that accelerates those?

She is already probably much more significant an icon as a (recent) mother though, mostly by virtue of numerous photoshoots of her unusually thin body while pregnant and then determination to return it to it’s former glory afterward (see number #11 here for the former and here and#15 here for the latter). Neither of which I bemoan her for as a celebrity in an already appearance-obsessed culture, and nor do I mean to imply that I think that Korean mothers are all mere passive followers of ideals of appearance set by celebrity mothers (let alone just one). Or then again, perhaps I should: as I explain here, many are already so concerned with their appearances that they: diet while pregnant; as a whole have proportionally more caesarean sections than any other group of women; and will quickly bottle-feed after birth in order to diet again, even though as fellow blogger Melissa points out here, breastfeeding is actually the surest means of losing baby-fat. And as she goes on:

What Korea needs is some famous (slim & beautiful) celebrity mom to talk about the glories of nursing/expressing milk and we’d start to see an increase in numbers. ^^

And when Son Tae-young said she was breastfeeding her son, there appeared to be the distinct possibility of that! But by wearing that particular outfit, then clearly she isn’t any more, even though it’s only been four months since the birth, and at least a year is best for the baby. Sigh.

Like I said, that’s showbiz, and I don’t bemoan her for it. Nonetheless, it’s a pity that Korea is still waiting.

(For all posts in the “Korean Sociological Image” series, see here)

( “Going Down” by David Smeaton )

For the article in full, on Seoul Mayor Oh Se Hoon’s “Happy Women, Happy Seoul” plan involving the provision of such things as more women’s toilets and the notorious pink parking spaces, see here. Meanwhile, for readers coming from there, see #2 here for the specific quote of Lee Myung-bak’s for which the blog was mentioned, and #2 here for more information on Korea’s disproportionately low Gender Empowerment Measure.

I would also add – with no offense to reporter Veronica Zaragovia, who necessarily had to omit most of what her sources said or cut it to a few words – that the argument that “the plan may end up reasserting South Korean women’s secondary status more than boosting it” is also one that I made in our phone conversation. I based it on the knowledge that the pink parking spaces were made wider in order to better accommodate loading and unloading pushchairs and so on (see #3 here), which had reminded me of this post from Sociological Images about the images in our daily lives that serve to subtly reaffirm the notion that childcare is primarily women’s responsibility. In that vein, while the extra space may well be appreciated by mothers, consider that if I were to park in one of those spaces myself, with just as pressing a need for the space to deal with my two young daughters in the back as my wife would have, then as a man I would be likely either be fined or shooed away.

I grant you, it sounds innocuous. But place that into the context of Korean women having the lowest workforce participation rate in the OECD, the result of a combination of a lack of childcare facilities and an enduring male-breadwinner mentality that forces a stark choice between motherhood or a career, then the underlying sexist logic becomes apparent. Moreover, with Korea in turn having the lowest birthrate in the world, the economic effects of which will be felt soon, then one might reasonably ask if the money could have been better spent.

p.s. Apologies in advance for some light blogging this week; I have a conference presentation to give this weekend.

Update, January 19 2010: See The JoongAng Daily here for all the ways in which programs like this have been considerably expanded since this post was written, now including pink spaces for women at bus stops, on buses, in parking lots and special pink taxis under the rubric of improving women’s safety (via: The Marmot’s Hole).

( Source: Dramabeans )

Yes, those really did happen in the last couple of months.

Perhaps it was naive of me to be so shocked and surprised however? After all, according to the Korea Herald, “about 30 [doctors] have been brought to the court over the past 5 years, mostly resulting in probation or fines”, so presumably this latest case technically isn’t the first time a Korean doctor has been incarcerated for performing an abortion (for 1 year, with probation for 2 years). And then the Lee Myung-bak Administration did signal it would begin enforcing Korea’s long-ignored abortion laws over a year ago too, in a vain and wholly misguided effort to increase the record-low birthrate, so prosecutions had to emerge sooner or later.

Still, I’d be surprised if this wasn’t the first time a pregnant woman has been fined for just planning an abortion, and according to the law she could even face having her baby in jail herself if she tries again. And the fact that she was charged as a result of her husband informing the police? It sounds positively Dickensian.

Seriously, is he physically confining her to their home as I type this? Is she still allowed to divorce him, or has she been stripped of that right too?

My second surprise was that, yet again, I didn’t actually learn of this important news via any English-language media, but rather via the following humble-looking video passed on to me by a Facebook friend, who in turn found it via her friend Heejung Paik of Gwangju Womenlink (광주여성민우회). Simply a very brief overview of Korean’s draconian abortion laws in the global context rather than a discussion of the cases themselves though, I’ve just translated those parts relevant to Korea below:

From 0:21-0:39:

2010년 3월, 멕시코 165명의 여성 낙태로 수감중

멕시코 구아나후아토주 여성, 최대 35년형 낙태로 선고

2010년 9월, 한국의사 낙태시술로 징역 1년 선고

In March of 2010, in Mexico 165 women were incarcerated for having abortions.

One of those women, in the state of Guanajuato, got the maximum sentence of 35 years.

In September of 2010, a Korean doctor was sentenced to 1 year in jail for performing an abortion.

Next, two visuals from 1:04-1:20 (apologies for the poor quality):

On the left:

Estimated number of abortions performed annually (in brackets, the number of 15-44 year-old women out of 1000 that had abortions)

Married: 198,000 (28.6/1000)

Unmarried: 144,000 (31.6/1000)

Source: Ministry of Welfare and Family Affairs (2005; now defunct)

On the right:

Out of 342,433 abortions,  4.4% (or 14,939) were legal, and 95.6% (or 327,494) were illegal.

Estimation based on 2005 survey of 201 abortion clinics, and 2004 health insurance records of legal abortions.

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare

From 1:50-1:58:

유교적인 조선시대에서조차 낙태한 여성이 처벌받은 기록이 없다

Even in the Confucian Joseon Dynasty there is no record of any punishment for abortion

( Source )

From 2:17-2:35:

강간, 근친 상간 또는 임부의 건강 보호를 이유로만 낙태가 가능한 나라 (멕시코, 브라질, 수단, 대한민국 등 17개국)

한국보다 낮은 등급의 국가는 전체의 약 27%에 불과하며,

이란, 아프가니스탄, 리비아 등의 국가가 속해있다.

현재 OECD 국가 20개 중 한국보다 낙태시술이 어려운 나라는 단  2개국뿐이다.

There are 17 countries that allow abortion only in the case of rape, incest and if the health of mother is threatened (Mexico, Brazil, Sudan, South Korea, and so on)

Altogether, only 27% of countries provide less abortion rights than Korea, including Iran, Afghanistan, and Libya.

At present, out of the 20 countries in the OECD, there are only 2 in which it is more difficult to obtain an abortion than Korea.

Finally, from 3:09-3:16:

2010년 10월, 한국에서는 낙태를 한 여성이 남편의 고발로 검찰에 기소되어 벌금형을 선고 받았다.

In October 2010, a Korean woman was fined after her husband informed the police of her intention to have an abortion.

( Source )

And on that note, apologies for not providing details about the cases myself in this post, but as I finishing typing this at 1:30am (albeit with a final edit over a coffee 9 hours later) then my translations of Korean articles on those will have to wait until later this weekend sometime next week I’m afraid. Hence the “newsflash” in the title!

Until then though, is anyone aware of any English-language articles on them that I may have missed? And how do you personally feel about the news?

( Source )

Like Lindsay Lohan says, some stories do indeed keep on growing. And the more I’ve learned about abortion in recent weeks, the more certain I am that if it doesn’t become a hot political issue for Lee Myung-bak in the remaining years of his presidency, then it certainly will be if not addressed by his successor.

Not so much because Koreans feel strongly about the issue itself however. Rather, because this is the same president that despite campaign promises not to, immediately tried to abolish the (then) Ministry of Gender Equality for instance. And also, because a year later, he encouraged targeting women for mass layoffs as a solution to the financial crisis.

Criminalizing abortion simply in order to increase the birthrate rate then, is really part and parcel of a wider mentality that is fundamentally failing to get to grips with women’s entrenched inequality here. And perhaps could come be the symbol and/or catalyst for later volatile protests about any number of related issues, much like those in 2008 were never really simply about imported beef.

Until then, following on from this earlier post about a video that alerted me to the fact that doctors were getting (suspended) sentences for performing abortions, I’ve translated the following article to give you more information about those. And in the process, I’ve confirmed commenter Matt of Gusts of Popular Feeling’s point about it that no doctor mentioned actually had to spend any time in jail.

However, as you’ll see, the article does not appear to say that the manager of the gynecology clinic in Suwon also got a suspended sentence, which would presumably mean that in fact he or she at least did go to jail. Which seems just a little unfair and confusing, so if anyone with better Korean skills can please clarify, then that would be much appreciated!^^ (source, right)

“잇따른 ‘낙태죄’ 실형선고 부당해“

“Continued Sentences for ‘Abortion Crimes’ are Unjust”

<임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크>규탄성명 발표 / A Public Denouncement by The Network for Pregnancy & Birth Decision Rights (NPBDR)

최근 들어 인공임신중절을 시술한 의사에게 실형이 선고되는 사례가 잇따르자 이에 대한 비판의 목소리가 커지고 있다. 이례적인 처벌 강화가 인공임신중절 시술의 위축을 가져와 여성들의 안전과 건강을 위협할 것이라는 우려에서다.

Recently, criticism has been growing of the numbers of doctors receiving sentences for performing abortions. There is a great deal of worry and anxiety that singling out abortion laws for enforcement will reduce the number of abortions and be dangerous for women’s safety and health.

‘임신중절’ 시술 의사에게 실형판결 잇따라 / Doctors are continually being sentenced for performing abortions

지난 9월 3일 울산지방법원은 인공임신중절을 시술한 의사에게 1심에서 징역 6월에 집행유예 1년, 자격정지 1년을 선고했다. 이에 앞서 지난 8월 수원지방법원은 역시 인공임신중절 시술 혐의로 고발된 산부인과 의사와 사무장에게 각각 징역 1년에 집행유예 2년, 징역 2년 6월의 실형을 선고했다.

On the 3rd of September, in the first session of a case at Ulsan District Court, a doctor who performed an abortion was given a 6-month jail sentence suspended for 1 year (i.e. no jail), and was stripped of their doctor’s license for 1 year. And in August at Suwon District Court, a gynecologist who was suspected of performing an abortion and the gynecology clinic manager were given a 1 year sentence suspended for 2 years and a 2 year, 6 month jail sentence respectively.

이는 그동안 인공임신중절에 대한 기소 건수 자체가 적었고, 기소되더라도 선고유예에 그치는 경우가 대부분이었던 것과 비교해 이례적이라는 평가다. (source, right)

Even though the number of cases of doctors that have received sentences for performing abortions is small, and most have received suspended sentences, compared with those the above cases are quite exceptional.

올해 2월 프로라이프의사회가 인공임신중절 시술을 한 의료기관 3곳을 고발했을 때에도 사무장이 구속 기소된 한 곳을 제외하고 각각 벌금 200만원에 약식기소, 무혐의 처리를 받았을 뿐이다.

In February, a pro-life doctor’s association filed suits against 3 clinics where abortions were being performed, but in all but one the managers simply to had to pay fines of 2 million won each in out of court settlements.

또 한 지난 5월에는 부산지방법원에서 임신 7주의 여성에게 인공임신중절을 시술한 혐의로 기소된 의사에 대해서도 선고유예판결을 내렸다. 당시 재판관은 “낙태에 대한 처벌과 관련해 공권력의 처벌의지가 상대적으로 미약했던”사실에 비춰 “의사에 대한 처벌은 형평성에 어긋난다”고 선고유예의 이유를 밝혔다.

In May, at Busan District Court, a doctor who was suspected of performing an abortion on a woman who was 7 weeks pregnant received a suspended sentence. In that case, the judge said in his or her judgment that “the government’s will for punishing abortion-related crimes is relatively weak”, and that the reason for the suspended sentence in that case was that “the [prescribed] punishment ran counter to notions of social equity”.

의사에게 징역형을 선고한 울산지방법원의 김정민 재판관이 “태아의 생명은 사람의 생명과 마찬가지로 형법이 보호하고자 하는 매우 중요한 법익”이라며 “형법의 비추에 피고인의 범행은 그 죄질이 가볍다고 볼 수 없”다고 선고 이유를 밝힌 것과 대조적이다.

In complete contrast, Kim Jeong-min, the judge who gave the jail sentence to the manager in Ulsan, said the reason was that “a fetus’s life is exactly the same a person’s life, and deserves the full benefit and protection of the law”, and hence “the defendant’s crime could not be punished lightly”.

( Source )

“징역형 선고, 중절수술 위축시킬 것”

“With Sentences, the Number of Abortions Will Go Down”

특히 9월 울산지방법원의 판결은 임신 10주의 ‘초기낙태’와 ‘10대여성의 낙태’에 대해 징역형을 선고한 것이어서 판결이 던진 파장이 심상치 않다. ‘의학적으로 시술이 안전한’ 12주 미만의 인공임신중절은 이미 많은 국가에서 합법화되어 있으며, 10대 임신의 경우에도 현실적으로 양육의 어려움이 있어 사실상 임신중절 허용사유로 용인되어 왔기 때문이다.

In particular, the September case in Ulsan has generated a lot of controversy because the doctor’s sentence was for an abortion performed on a teenage girl who was 10 weeks pregnant. After all, not only is abortion in the first trimester completely safe and legal in many countries, but the general consensus is that such young girls have special difficulties in raising a child.

이 판결에 대해 <임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크>는 29일 “여성의 결정권을 원천적으로 부정하는” 판결이라며 규탄성명을 내고, 항소심에 적극 대응할 것을 천명하고 나섰다. 임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크는 인공임신중절을 범죄화하는 움직임에 대응하기 위해 결성된 단체로서, 여성·노동·진보 단체들과 진보신당, 민주노동당이 함께 참여하고 있다.

< 임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크>는 잇따른 “징역형 선고가 선례가 돼 올해 2~3월처럼 낙태 수술이 위축돼 낙태 수술비가 치솟고, 낙태를 필요로 하는 여성들이 심각한 어려움에 처하게 될 것”이라고 심각한 우려를 표했다.

On the 29th of September, the NPBDR denounced that judgment as “fundamentally denying women’s rights” and that the group would actively appeal it. The NPBDR is an organization that was established to fight against the criminalization of abortion in conjunction with women’s groups, worker’s groups, progressive groups and the New Progressive and Democratic Labor Party. In addition, the NPBDR expressed serious worry about the “continuing cases of sentencing for abortions, which like those cases in February and March set precedents, and were accompanied by decreases in the numbers of abortions and a sudden rise in their expenses, which became a serious concern for women seeking abortions.”

( Source )

실제로 올해 2월 프로라이프 의사회의 산부인과 고발 후, 산부인과의 임신중절 시술 기피로 인해 고통을 호소하는 상담전화가 여성단체에 빗발쳤다. 시술비용이 치솟았고, 비싼 수술비와 처벌에 대한 두려움 때문에 ‘원정낙태’를 알아보는 여성들까지 나타났었다.

After a pro-life doctor’s group filed suit against gynecologists in February, the reality was that they started avoiding providing abortion services, leading to a torrent of pleads for help from women to women’s groups’ hotlines. Because of the sudden increase in their expenses, and the fear of being punished, many women are now considering getting abortions overseas.

‘임신중절 허용’ 법 개정 움직임에 역행

Such Judgments Work Against Abortion Law Reform

< 임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크>는 특히 “여성운동이 여성의 요청에 의한 낙태를 허용하라는 목소리를 높이고 있고, 한나라당 홍일표 의원, 산부인과의사회, 법무부 형사법개정특별심의위원회 등도 제한적이나마 낙태를 허용하는 방향의 법 개정을 주장”하고 있는 상황에서 이런 판결이 나온 것에 대해 깊은 유감을 나타냈다.

The NPBDR, deeply saddened by the above cases, says “women’s movements and women in general are raising their voices high in their demands for legalizing abortion, and have the support of National Assemblyman Hong Il-pyeo of the ruling Grand National Party, gynecologists’ groups, and the Special Committee for the Reform of Criminal Law under the Ministry of Justice, and so on, that, although they only have limited political power, are also insisting on the legalization of abortion.”

“낙태가 불법화된 나라들이 합법화된 나라들보다 낙태율이 오히려 더 높”은 것에서도 드러나듯, “처벌이 결코 낙태를 줄일 수 없다”는 사실에 대해 이미 국제사회뿐만 아니라 우리나라에서도 공감대가 확산되고 있는 시점에서 시대착오적인 판결이라는 것이다. 현재 국제사회에서는 유엔 여성차별철폐협약(CEDAW)에 근거해 인공임신중절한 여성을 처벌하는 ‘낙태죄’ 폐지를 각국에 권고하고 있다.

Also, “compared to countries where abortion is legal, in fact abortion rates are higher in countries that have criminalized it,” and this means that “criminalizing abortions can never bring abortion rates down,” a fact that at this point in time not just international society, but Koreans also agree on, and so find the above judgments an anachronism. Presently, on the basis of the Convention on the U.N. Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), international society is recommending each country to abolish laws defining abortion as a crime and not punishing women who have abortions. (source, above)

< 임신․출산 결정권을 위한 네트워크>는 “출산은 여성의 삶 전체에 지대한 영향”을 미치고 “출산에 뒤따르는 책임을 감당할 당사자도 여성”이라는 점을 환기시키며 “자신의 삶에 대해 신중하게 고민하고 낙태를 결정한 여성을 범죄자 취급해서는 안 된다”고 못 박았다. 또한 앞으로 있을 항소심에 대한 구체적 대응을 준비 중에 있다고 덧붙였다.

Finally, the NPBDR wants to remind everyone that “giving birth is the single most influential thing in a woman’s whole life,” and is accompanied by a great deal of anxiety about how and if she will be able to cope with her new role as a mother. The group firmly insisted that “accordingly women who have agonized over this and come to the final decision to have an abortion should not be treated like criminals,” and added that they were making strenuous efforts to prepare to fight for their appeal against the Suwon judgment (end).

And on that note, apologies for not finding any information about the woman fined for simply planning an abortion, as mentioned in the earlier post, and I’ll keep looking. But in the meantime, I was very happy to read about the palpable resistance to Lee Myung-bak’s anti-abortion drive that is already emerging!

(Source: Dramabeans)

With thanks to Marilyn for translating it, allow me to present the fourth and final article in the Sex and the University series:

겁많은 스무살 기자의 산부인과 검진 체험기 / A scared 20 year-old reporter’s ob-gyn exam experience (19 in Western age)

대한산부인과학회는 지난 5월 ‘퍼플리본 캠페인’을 시작했다. 올해부터 매년 5월 셋째 주에 진행될 예정인 이 캠페인은 여성암 중 사망률 2위를 차지하고 있지만 비교적 잘 알려지지 않은 자궁경부암에 대해 알리고 검진율이 낮은 20~30대 여성들의 관심을 유도하기 위한 것이다. 김상운 사무총장은 “많은 여성질환들이 젊을 때부터 정기검진을 하면 예방효과가 크다”며 대학생들도 산부인과 검진을 받을 것을 권했다. 그러나 이러한 필요성에도 불구하고 많은 여대생들이 병원을 찾기를 꺼린다. 산부인과는 임신한 여성들만 찾는 다는 인식이 미혼 여성들로 하여금 산부인과 문턱을 넘는 일을 어렵게 만들기 때문이다.

Last May, the Korean Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology started the “purple ribbon” campaign.   This purposes of this campaign, planned to take place during the third week of May from this year [2010] on, are to raise awareness of cervical cancer, which, though the second deadliest of cancers that only affect women, is not well known, and to increase interest among women in their 20s and 30s, who rarely get screenings.  Secretary-general  Kim Sang-woon said, “If many female patients get regular screenings from a young age, there will be great preventative effects,” and recommended that university students get ob-gyn exams as well.  However, despite such necessity, many female college students are reluctant to visit a clinic.  This is because the belief that only pregnant women go there makes entering the ob-gyn’s office difficult for unmarried women.

(Source)

이런 상황에 놓인 여대생들을 대표해 10학번 새내기 기자가 직접 산부인과를 방문해 검진을 받아보기로 했다. 미혼여성을 대상으로 한 가장 기본적인 검진은 초음파 검사와 혈액검사라고 한다. 기자는 인터넷을 통해 신촌의 산부인과를 수소문한 끝에 신촌역 근처 S산부인과로 결정했다. 방문 전 인터넷사이트의 예약 게시판에 평소 생리통이 심했던 기자의 고충을 적고 예약을 완료했다.

Representing college women put in this kind of situation, this freshman reporter, who entered university in 2010, agreed to personally visit an ob-gyn and get an exam.  It is said that the most basic exam for unmarried women is an ultrasound and a blood test.  After asking around about Sinchon-area obstetrician-gynecologists on the Internet, I chose ‘S’ Obstetrics-Gynecology, near Sinchon Station.  Before going, I wrote on the appointment board on the clinic’s website that my problem was severe menstrual pain and booked my appointment.

예약한 날짜가 다가와 초조한 마음으로 병원을 찾았다. 산부인과와의 인연은 20년 전 태어나며 맺었던 것이 마지막이라 그곳에서 무슨 일이 생길지 도무지 감이 잡히지 않았다. 잠시 기다리자 접수대에서 이름이 호명됐고 전문의와 오늘 받을 검진의 기본적인 사항에 대한 이야기를 나눴다. 혈액검사는 난소암 유무를 가리기 위한 것이고, 초음파 검사는 자궁에 근종이나 난소에 혹이 있는지를 알아보기 위한 것인데 항문 또는 질을 통해 검사한다고 했다. 검진 받는 여성의 성관계 여부에 따라 추가적인 암 검사가 더해진다. 그렇게 접수를 마치고 이유 모를 공포에 휩싸여 호명되기를 기다렸다. 내 나이 꽃다운 스무살, 산부인과에 있다는 사실만으로도 이미 부인과 질병에 걸려버린 느낌이라 불안감은 점점 더 증폭됐다 (source, below).

The appointment date approached and I went to the clinic with an anxious heart.  My last connection to the ob-gyn had been made when I was being born twenty years ago, so I had no clue what was about to happen there.   After waiting a moment, my name was called by the front desk and I talked with the specialist [prob. the doctor] about the basics of the exam I would receive that day.  The specialist said the blood test would detect ovarian cancer, and the ultrasound would check for uterine fibroids and ovarian cysts; the exam would be done through the anal passage or vagina.  Contingent upon the sexual activity of the woman receiving the exam, additional cancer screenings are added.   In that manner, I completed my registration and then, filled with fear without knowing why, I waited for my name to be called.  I am a 20-year-old in the bloom of youth, but just the fact that I was at the ob-gyn gave me the feeling that I already had a gynecological disease, and my discomfort continued to increase.

먼저 초음파 검사를 받기 위해 탈의실로 가 아래를 모두 벗고 발목까지 오는 긴 치마를 입었다. 두려운 마음으로 검진실 문을 열자 특이한 모양의 의자가 보였다. 치과 의자처럼 생겼는데 다리를 벌려 고정하는 받침대가 추가된 형태였다. 좋지 않은 예감이 든다. 예감적중, 간호사가 의자에 누워 다리를 벌리라고 한다. 겁에 질려 검사가 아프냐고 묻자 간호사는 태연하게 “불편할 수 있어요”라고 대답한다.

First, in order to get the ultrasound exam, I went to a changing room, took off all of my lower-body clothing and put on a long skirt that reached to my ankles.  Fearfully, I opened the exam room door and saw a specially-shaped chair.  It looked like a dentist’s chair but with the addition of a rack to which spread legs could be fastened.  I had a bad feeling about that.  My feeling was right – the nurse told me to lay down on the chair and spread my legs.  Scared, I asked if the exam would hurt; the nurse calmly answered, “It may be uncomfortable.”

이윽고 냉철한 표정의 여의사가 들어와 초음파 검사 도구를 항문에 집어넣는다. 간호사 말대로다. 아프지는 않지만 확실히 ‘불편’했다. 마치 배변을 보고 있는 듯한 느낌이 몰려왔다가 사라졌다. 윤활제를 바른 탓에 시원한 느낌이 들었다. 기분이 묘하다. 이 와중에 그나마 여의사라 다행이라는 생각을 한다.

(Sources: left, right)

Before long, the female doctor entered with a dispassionate expression and put the ultrasound exam instrument in my anal passage.  It was as the nurse had said.  It didn’t hurt, but it was certainly uncomfortable.  A strong feeling that I was about to have a bowel movement came and disappeared.   Because of the lubricant spread [on the instrument], there was a cool sensation.  I felt strange.  At that time, I thought it was at least fortunate that it was a woman doctor.

누워서 눈앞의 스크린을 보자 나의 자궁과 난소가 보인다. 혹이나 다른 이상은 발견되지 않았다. 스크린을 보던 의사가 “생리하실 때 아플 것처럼 생긴 자궁이네요”라고 말했다. 산부인과에 온 목적이 해결되는 감동적인 순간, 내 몸에는 전혀 이상이 없으며 단지 ‘자궁 모양’ 문제였음을 깨닫는다. 산부인과에 진작 왔으면 불안에 떨지 않아도 되었을 것을. 며칠 뒤에는 “난소암 혈액검사 결과, 정상입니다”라는 간략한 문자가 도착했다. 모든 검사 종료, 이제야 안도했다.

(Source)

As I lay and looked at the screen in front of me, my cervix and ovaries were visible.  No cysts or other irregularities were detected.  The doctor, looking at the screen, said, “Your cervix looks like it would hurt during menstruation.”  At this emotional moment in which my purpose for coming to the ob-gyn was resolved, I realized that there was nothing wrong with my body, only a problem with “cervix shape.”  Also, that had I come to the ob-gyn earlier, I wouldn’t have needed to be anxious [about the pain].  A few days later, the brief text message, “Your ovarian cancer blood test results were normal” arrived.   At the end of all the exams, I finally felt relieved.

스무살 기자에게 산부인과 검사는 약간의 수치와 6만원이라는 비용을 수반한다는 점에서 그리 유쾌한 경험은 아니었다. 하지만 자신의 몸을 위해 한 번은 가볼 필요가 있는 것 같다. 기자의 경우 마침 결과가 좋아 적어도 5년 동안은 다시 이 경험을 하지 않아도 되겠다 싶어 안심했다. 그러나 부인과 질병에 가족력이 있거나 성관계 경험이 있을 경우 1년에 한 번씩은 산부인과에 가는 것이 좋다고 하니, 참고하면 되겠다.

Considering the slight shame and the 60,000 Won fee, the ob-gyn exam was not a very pleasant experience for this 20 year-old reporter.  However, it does seem that going once is necessary, for the sake of one’s body.  I felt relieved that I wouldn’t have to have this experience again for at least five years because the results happened to be good in my case.  Just know that if you have a family history of gynecological diseases or have sexual experience, though, they said that going to the ob-gyn once a year is good (end).

(Source)

A little disappointed with the reporter’s plan not to lose her virginity in the next 5 year however, a genuine waste of one’s youth(!), then let me end on a rather more lecherous note via the above image, found in passing while preparing this post. Indeed, with a cover that says “Reasons Women Have To Get On Top“, the book sounds intriguing, and now I feel like doing some translating of my own next week!^^

(For more in the Sex and the University series, please see Parts 1-3 on students’ levels of sexual experience and activity, on an interview with a sex columnist, and on students’ cohabitation culture respectively)

(Source: unknown)

If there was only one statistic that best sums up contemporary Korean society, then that would be its “Gender Empowerment Measure” (GEM). Calculated by the UNDP, it is:

…an indicator of women’s degree of participation in political and economic activity and the policy-making process, using for its evaluation factors such as the number of female legislators, the percentage of women in senior official and managerial positions, the percentage of women in professional and technical positions, and the income differential between men and women (source).

Or, to put it graphically (see here for more details):

And why Korea’s GEM is so revealing is not just because of its abysmal ranking, which, at 68th out of 179 countries surveyed, is bested even by developing countries such as Kyrgyzstan, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Vietnam, Moldova, Botswana, and Nicaragua. Rather, it’s because that rank is so out of sync with its other rank of 25 in the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures a country’s  standard of living. Surely, as I explained two years ago, there is no greater testament to the palpable gender apartheid here, than the fact that Korea does such a good job of educating and taking care of the health its citizens, only then to effectively exclude fully half of them from political and economic power?

(Source: unknown)

Mentioning this in a conference paper I’m writing on Korean girl groups however, as one does, earlier today my coauthor quite reasonably asked me if a more up to date ranking wasn’t available?

Alas, no. But there did appear to have been some recalculating of the 2008 figures done, with the first thing I saw from my search giving Korea a new ranking of, well, 20th best in the world:

Needless to say, I did a double-take. And indeed, as most of you have probably already guessed, actually the GEM has been abolished. Instead, Korea now has a ranking of 20 in what’s called the “Gender Inequality Index” (GII), calculated according to the following criteria:

What to take away from this? Well first, if I do say so myself, that it’s a pretty interesting thing to end up with, having originated from a paragraph that just one line earlier discusses Girls’ Generation’s signature hot pants.

But more seriously, I do want to stress the incredible achievements that Korea has made in terms of affordable, quality healthcare, well-illustrated by a recent anecdote from Ask a Korean! on a Korean stroke victim in New York, who quite rationally choose to fly 13 hours back to Korea rather than be treated in a hospital there. And it’s also indicative of how dangerous it can still be for women to give birth in many parts of the world, with 1 in 16 new mothers dying in Sub-Saharan Africa for instance, that the UNDP has good reason to think that the Maternal Mortality Ratio needs to be considered in any worldwide measure of gender inequality.

Nevertheless, while budding Canadian politicians, for example, are already taking advantage of their country’s new ranking behind Japan (yet another new paragon of feminist virtue) to say it’s all the government’s fault, it’s probably Korea jumping from 68th to 20th that should be getting the most attention. After all, albeit with apologies to long-term readers for the frequent mention, it does have: among the lowest female workforce participation rates in the OECD; the lowest rate of employment for educated women in the OECD (in fact, Korea is the only country in the OECD where the more educated the woman, the less likely she is to be employed); the largest gender wage gap in the OECD; only 13.7% of its legislators women; and a President that encouraged the mass firing of women to get over the latest financial crisis.

(Source)

At the very least then, Korea’s example seriously questions the applicability of the GII to developed countries. But can readers can think of any other issues raised?

(Source)

What? It said that? In 2011??

No, hopefully not so recently, especially with the increasing criminalization of abortion since last year. But as you’ll soon see, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (보건복지부) certainly did once define unwed mothers as such, and I’d wager within at least the last decade.

It was just in 2008, for instance, that singer Ivy (아이비) was vilified in the media for the heinous crime of having sex with her boyfriend, so by those standards the Ministry’s comments were not particularly outlandish. And while Ivy did eventually rehabilitate her reputation, unfortunately Korean society is still far from accepting women being so sexually “open and impulsive”, let alone so blatantly so as to have a child out of wedlock.

Whatever the date though, when even the organization charged with helping unwed mothers once stigmatized them, then you can imagine how badly they fare in society today.

Despite that, abortion opponents seem to have quite a sanguine image of what it’s like to raise a child as a single mother. Which is what prompted this anonymous Korean woman, who kindly recently wrote on TGN about how and why she got an abortion, to post a link to this imomNews article outlining how the reality is anything but. With thanks to Marilyn for translating it, here it is in full:

(Update – To my shock and disappointment, the Ministry’s appalling definition was actually on its website until as recently as May 2010)

‘동성애자’ 다음으로 차별 받는 집단 ‘미혼모 / Unwed Mothers Most Discriminated Group after Homosexuals

인식 개선 선행…정부지원 확대 /[With] improvement in perception as precedent. . . expansion of government aid

Image Caption: 최근 정치권을 중심으로 ‘미혼모’ 지원방안이 활발히 이루어지고 있다. 지난 3일 서울 여의도 국회에서는 ‘미혼모 지원정책 개선방안’ 포럼이 개최됐다 /Currently, political methods for supporting unwed mothers are actively becoming reality.  On Aug. 3, at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, an “Unwed Mothers Support Measures Improvement” forum was held.

‘학력이 대체로 낮고, 불안정한 직업에 종사한다. 자취나 하숙을 하고, 성에 대한 가치관이 개방적이고 충동적이다. 사회경제적 상태가 낮고 부모와 떨어져 사는 사람’이라고 과거 보건복지부가 운영하는 웹사이트 건강길라잡이는 미혼모에 대한 정의를 이렇게 내렸다.

“Usually low levels of education, with an unstable job. Lives by herself or in a boarding house, has open and impulsive sexual values.  A person whose socioeconomic situation is low, and who lives apart from her parents,” is how a website health guide operated by the past Ministry of Health and Welfare defined unwed mothers.

이처럼 사회의 부정적인 시선 탓에 미혼모에 대한 관심과 지원은 일부 사회복지시설을 제외하곤 전무후무한 것이 사실이었다.

Because of society’s negative views like these, it was true that, as for interest in and support for unwed mothers, a few social welfare facilities were the first and seemed like they would be the last.

특히, 1990년대 이후 정부와 시민단체 등의 노력으로 조손가정, 다문화 가정, 한부모 가정 등은 상당부분 인식개선이 이루어 졌으나 미혼모 가족만은 사회의 편견 속에 여전히 ‘눈총’의 대상이 되고 있다.

In particular, through the efforts of the government and civic organizations since the 1990s, perception of grandparent-grandchild families, multicultural families, and single-parent families has improved; among society’s prejudices, only unwed-mother families continue to be the target of stares.

때문에 형편이 좋지 않아 자립이 힘든 미혼모들은 자연히 입양을 생각하거나 권유받게 되고, 우리사회도 ‘낳아 기르는 쪽’ 보다는 입양을 암묵적으로 유도했다.

(I Came From Busan, 2009. Source)

Because of that, unwed mothers, whose circumstances are not good and so have difficulty supporting themselves, think of adoption of their own accord or are induced to adopt, and our society also implicitly supports the “have and raise side” less than it does adoption.

사정이 이렇다 보니 지난해 우리나라의 해외입양아는 미혼모의 자녀가 90%를 차지한 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 최근 이들에 대한 지원방안이 정치권과 시민단체, 기업 등을 중심으로 활발하게 논의되면서 미혼모 가족에 대한 관심이 일고 있다.

Because of this situation, last year it emerged that 90% of internationally adopted children from our country were the children of unwed mothers.  However, as ways to support them are currently being actively discussed in political circles, civic organizations, and businesses, interest in unwed-mother families is rising.

Image Caption: 던킨도너츠는 미혼모 정소향(21세) 씨를 정규사원으로 채용하면서 미혼모 채용에 적극 나서기로 했다 /By hiring unwed mother Jeong So-Hyang (21) as a permanent employee, Dunkin Donuts is actively taking a stand for the hiring of unwed mothers.

미혼모 인식 개선이 우선 / Improvement of perception of unwed mothers the priority

미혼모에게 가장 필요한 부분은 부정적인 사회의 시선이 관심과 보호의 시선으로 바뀌어야 하는 것이라고 전문가들은 지적했다.

Experts indicate that the most important thing unwed mothers must do is change negative societal views into feelings of interest and protection.

실제 지난 2009년 한국미혼모지원네트워크와 한국여성정책연구원이 실시한 ‘미혼모ㆍ부에 대한 한국인의 태도와 인식’ 설문조사에 따르면 미혼모는 동성애자 다음으로 가장 많은 차별을 경험한 집단으로 조사됐다.

In fact, according to the survey “Koreans’ attitudes toward and perception of unwed mothers and fathers,” carried out in 2009 by the Korean Unwed Mothers Support Network and the Korean Women’s Development Institute, unwed mothers were found to be the group that experienced the most prejudice, after homosexuals.

또한 설문에 참가한 2,000명 중 60% 이상이 미혼모에 대해 ‘판단력과 책임감이 부족한 사람’이라고 답변했다.

Also, of the 2,000 people who participated in the survey, over 60% answered that unwed mothers “are people who lack judgment and a sense of responsibility.”

김혜영 한국여성정책연구원 연구위원은 “미혼모의 경우 일종의 일탈자로 낙인 받고 있다”며 “미혼 부모에 대한 과감한 지원정책이 필요하다”고 지적했다.

(Sources: left, top-right, bottom-right)

Kim Hye-young, a senior researcher at the Korean Women’s Development Institute, said, “An unwed mother is branded as a kind of deviant.  We need bold support policies for unwed parents.”

이영호 서울시 한부모가족지원센터장도 “우리사회는 다양한 가족이 있고 모든 가족은 행복할 권리가 있다”면서 “그러나 우리 사회에서 미혼모가 아기를 키우면서 자랑스럽게 또는 당당하게 양육의 경험을 공유하고 그 안에서 성장할 수 있을까란 의문이 들때가 많다”고 아쉬움을 드러냈다.

Lee Young-ho, head of the Seoul City Single Parent Family Support Center, also showed frustration:  “There are diverse families in our society, and all families have a right to be happy.  However, there are many times when I question whether unwed mothers, while raising their children, can proudly or confidently share their child-rearing experiences and develop in that [kind of environment], in our society.”

이에 최근 여성단체와 미혼모 보호 시설은 미혼모 인신 개선 사업을 적 극 펼치고 있다.

Accordingly, women’s organizations and unwed-mother shelters are currently actively engaging in a project to improve the perception of unwed mothers.

지난달 28일 서울시한부모가족지원센터와 20여 곳의 미혼모관련 단체들은 ‘미혼모지원단체협의체’를 발족하고 미혼모 인식 개선을 위한 다양한 논의를 시작했다.

On July 28, the Seoul City Single Parent Family Support Center and about twenty organizations for unwed mothers started the ‘Unwed Mother Support Organization Council” and began a variety of discussions designed to improve the perception of unwed mothers.

그 첫 번째 사업으로 사람들에게 부정적 이미지가 강했던 ‘미혼모’를 공모를 통해 ‘두리모’로 대체하기로 했다. 두리모란 ‘둥근’이라는 뜻과 둘이라는 숫자를 의미하는 방언 ‘둘레’가 조합된 것이다.

For their first project, they agreed through a public contest to replace “unwed mother”, which had a strong negative image, with “doo-ree mother.” “Doo-ree mother” combines the meaning “round” [doong-geun] with the regional dialect word dool-leh, which means “two people.”

(Source)

정치권ㆍ기업, 미혼모 자립위해 노력 / Efforts by political groups, business for unwed mothers’ independence [ability to support themselves]

정치권에선 ‘미혼모 자립’을 위해 관련법을 정비하고, 토론회를 통해 다양한 의견을 청취하고 있다. 기업들도 미혼모를 우선 채용하는 등 이들의 자립을 위해 힘을 쏟고 있다.

Political groups are modifying laws in order for ‘independence for unwed mothers,’ and through panels, they are listening to diverse opinions.  Through actions like prioritizing hiring unwed mothers, businesses are also devoting themselves to the cause of their independence.

특히 민주당 최영희 의원(국회 여성가족위원회)은 미혼모에 대한 지원을 확대하는 내용을 담은 ‘입양촉진 및 절차에 관한 특례법 전부개정안’ 등 관련법을 최근 국회에 제출하는 등 법 만들기에 앞장서고 있다.

Democratic Party Assemblywoman Choi Young-hee (National Assembly Gender Equality and Family Committee), in particular, is leading the way in making laws, some of which are currently submitted to the National Assembly, like “Overall Revision Bill for the Special Act Relating to Promotion and Procedure of Adoption,” the contents of which expand support for unwed mothers.

또한 지난 3일에는 한국미혼모가족협회·한국여성정책연구원와 공동주최로 ‘미혼모 지원정책 개선방안’ 포럼을 개최했다.

(Source)

Also, on June 3, the Korean Unwed Mother Families Association and the Korean Womens Development Institute co-hosted the “Unwed Mothers Support-Policy Improvement Measures” forum.

이날 최 의원은 “해외입양의 90%가 미혼모의  자녀라는 점은 우리 사회의 아픈 현실을 반영하는 것”이라며 “직접 양육하기를 원하는 미혼모가 늘어나고 있는 만큼 양육비 지원을 현실화 하고 지역사회에서 안정적인 생활을 할 수 있도록 정부의 적극적인 지원이 시급하다”고 지적했다.

On that day, Assemblywoman Choi said, “That 90% of international adoption is the children of unwed mothers reflects our society’s painful reality.  As the number of unwed mothers who want to raise their children themselves rises, the government’s active support is urgently needed to actualize aid for child-raising expenses for a stable life in a community.”

한편 이날 포럼에서 김혜영 한국여성정책연구원 박사는 ‘양육미혼모의 자립기반실태와 지원방안’에 대한 연구결과를 발표했다.

Also at this forum, Dr. Kim Hye-young, researcher at the Korean Women’s Development Institute, revealed the results of a study on the “Current State of Groundwork for Independence of and Ways to Support Unwed Mothers Raising Children.”

김 연구원은 “60%가 넘는 미혼모가 양육비와 교육비의 문제로 어려움을 겪고 있고, 80%이상은 월세와 같은 불안정적인 주거생활을 하는 것으로 나타났다”면서 “안정적인 자립기반 구축을 위해 미혼모 가족에 대한 조기 개입의 필요성과 함께 지원의 폭을 보다 확대할 필요가 있다”고 주장했다.

Dr. Kim said, “It showed that over 60% of unwed mothers are struggling because of the costs of child-rearing and education, and more than 80% live in unstable housing situations like [those requiring] monthly rent. In order to build stable foundations for independence, early intervention for unwed-mother families, together with an expansion of the range of support, is necessary.” (Source, right)

또 목경화 한국미혼모가족협회 대표도 “우리나라의 미혼모정책은 시설에만 초점이 맞춰져 있어 시설에서 벗어나 자립을 하려는 미혼모들은 빈곤 상황을 쉽게 개선하지 못하는 실정이다”고 지적했다.

Furthermore, Mok Gyeong-hwa, a representative from the Korean Unwed Mothers and Families Association, pointed out, “Policies regarding unwed mothers in our country only focus on facilities, so unwed mothers who want to break free from facilities and live independently can’t easily improve their state of poverty.”

최 의원은 이날 논의된 내용을 바탕으로 ‘한부모가족지원법 개정안’과 ‘국민기초생활보장법 개정안’을 제출할 예정이다.

Assemblywoman Choi will present the “Single-Parent Family Support Law Amendment” and “National Basic Living Security Law Amendment” based on the discussions of that day.

기업들도 미혼모 자립을 위해 적극적으로 나서고 있다. 던킨도너츠와 배스킨라빈스를 운영하는 비알코리아는 미혼모 시설인 사회복지법인 동방사회복지회와 함께 미혼모 고용지원 협약을 체결하고, 던킨도너츠 매장에서 파트타임으로 근무하던 미혼모 정소향(21세) 씨를 정식 사원을 채용했다

Businesses are also actively taking a stand for the independence of unwed mothers.  BR Korea, which operates Dunkin Donuts and Baskin Robbins, together with the  Eastern Social Welfare Society, a welfare corporation that is an unwed mother [support] facility, signed the Unwed Mothers Employment Support Agreement and recruited unwed mother Jeong So-hyang (21), who had been a part-time employee at a Dunkin Donuts shop,  as a permanent employee.

June 16, 2011.

Reporter: Cheon Won-gi (천원기, 000wonki@hanmail.net)

(Source)

As you’ll recall from last month’s article, about the Ministry of Health and Welfare (보건복지부; MOHW) once defining single mothers as having “low levels of education [and] impulsive sexual drives”, I promised to find out how recently that had been posted on the Ministry’s website, speculating that it was sometime within, say, the last decade or so.

You can imagine my surprise then, when Seunghee Han of the Korean Unwed Mothers Support Network (한국미혼모지원네트워크; KUMSN) informed me that wasn’t removed until as recently as May 2010. This was in response to Executive Director Heejung Kwon posting the definition on the Missmammamia (미스맘마미아) website, which prompted many mothers to write directly to the Ministry to complain.

Unfortunately however, the definition that has replaced it is also a little problematic, implying that most Korean single mothers are in their teens. Whereas that is certainly true of most Western countries though, and – if the 2008 Drama Little Mom Scandal (리틀맘 스캔들) above is any guide – may also be the Korean public’s perception, the reality is that most are in their late-twenties or early-thirties, as the following post on the KUMSN website makes clear:

(For a good introductory article to the plight of single mothers in Korea, see the New York Times here)

건강길라잡이사이트문제있습니다 / A Problem with the Health Guide Website

건강길라잡이는 보건복지가족부와 건강증진사업지원단에서 운영 중인 국민 모두의 건강증진을 위한 건강증진사업 홈페이지입니다. 그런데 여기에 쓰인 미혼모의 정의는 이상합니다.

The “Health Guide” is a website jointly run by the MOHW and the Management Center for Health Promotion for the public health of all citizens. However, the definition of single mothers on it is strange.

합법적이고 정당한 결혼절차 없이 임신중이거나 출산한 여자를 미혼모라고 정의내리고 있는데 마치 미혼 임신, 출산을 하면 모두 불법을 저지르고 있는 범죄인으로 여기고 있는 것 같습니다.

According to the definition, single mothers are women who are pregnant or who have given birth who have not gone through the legal and proper marriage procedures. Put this way, it sounds like all unmarried pregnant women or mothers have committed some sort of crime!

그리고 기본적으로 미혼모를 대부분 10대라 여기고 있습니다. 그러나 2010년 조사한 바로는 한 지역사회에 있는 미혼모의 경우, 평균 나이는 20대 후반 30대초반이라는 결과도 있었습니다.

Also, it basically says that most single mothers are in their teens, whereas according to the results of a survey of single mothers in one local area [James - unnamed] in 2010, most were in their late-twenties or early-thirties.

국민들의 건강을 증진하기 위해 유익한 정보를 제공하는 사이트에서도 이런 잘못된 정보를 제공하기 때문에 미혼모들에 대한 사회적인 인식이 더디게 바뀌고 있습니다. 잘못된 정보는 정정되어야 합니다.

Because there is wrong information even in a guide aimed at promoting citizens’ health, the public perception of single mothers is slow to change. This wrong information needs to be corrected.

(Source)

And here is the section of the guide/website referred to:

10대임신과미혼모 / Teen Pregnancy and Single Mothers

미혼모 : 합법적이고 정당한 결혼절차 없이 임신중이거나 출산한 여자.

Single Mother: A pregnant woman or mother who has not gone through the correct and proper marriage procedures.

산업화 도시화 과정, 성에 대한 가치관이나 태도의 변화, 이성교재의 범위가 늘어남에 따라 미혼모의 수가 계속적으로 증가. 미혼모 중 약 25%는 10대.

Because of industrialization and urbanization, people’s sense of values about and attitudes towards sex are changing, and more people [James - I think it means unmarried people] are having sexual relationships. Accordingly, the number of single mothers is rising, and roughly 25% of those are in their teens.

(James – Before you quite rightly point out that 25% isn’t “most” single mothers, the guide contradicts itself just two lines further down)

미혼모에 대한 정확한 통계는 없으나 전국 출산력 조사결과 18~34세 미만의 미혼여성들 중 3.4%가 임신의 경험이 있는 것으로 추정.

While it is difficult to get accurate statistics about single mothers, based on the results of a national birthrate survey [James - unnamed] it is estimated that 3.4% of single women aged between 18 and under 34 have had the experience of being pregnant (source, right).

미혼모는 대부분 10대 임신으로 교육적 경제적 정도가 낮아 충분한 건강관리를 받을 수 없으며 부모로서의 발달과업을 달성할 수 없다.

As most single mothers are teenagers, with inadequate access to healthcare and low levels of education and earning ability, then they can not really succeed as parents.

신체적인 미숙과 영양부족으로 유산, 조산, 저체중아 출산 등 고위험 임산부와 고위험 태아 및 신생아가 된다.

Teenagers that are not fully physically developed, and/or are malnourished, are at high risk of having miscarriages, premature births, underweight children, and/or complications during their pregnancy.

미혼인 여성이 임신을 하면 임신한 결과를 인공유산과 분만 중 어느 쪽을 선택할 것인지를 결정해야 하고 분만을 할 경우는 자신이 키울 것인지 입양을 시킬 것인지를 결정해야 한다.

If a single woman becomes pregnant, her two options are having an abortion or delivering the baby. If she chooses the latter, then she has to decide if she will raise it herself or offer it for adoption.

우리나라의 경우 84.8%가 인공유산, 분만은 15.2%(김승권, 1992)

In Korea, 84.8% of women in such a situation choose to have an abortion, and 15.2% choose to deliver it. (Kim Sung-gwon, 1992)

(Source)

Apologies for not being able to find the title of the book referred to for the last figure, but I’m afraid I’ll have to recover from the shock of seeing a 19 year-old source used before I start looking. Moreover, combine that with the sloppily-written, contradictory, and incorrect information provided earlier, then frankly – and ironically – it’s only as I type this that I realize how bad things must be for single mothers here.

Sure, call me melodramatic, and/or reading too much into what is most likely simply a hastily-written piece of work, but recall that it comes from an organization presumably charged with supporting single mothers, promoting their rights, and trying to overcome stereotypes. Yet if that’s the best that it can do, then I shudder to think of how other organizations and segments of society treat them, with the sterling exception of the KUMSN.

But to end on a lighter note: has anybody seen Little Mom Scandal, and/or know how sympathetic it was to single mothers? Please let me know!

(Thanks to Seunghee Han of the KUMSN for the information. And also to Marilyn for putting me in touch with her, and again for translating October’s much longer article!)

…American military officers helped make abortion the population control tool of choice in those Asian countries where they wielded influence, first in Japan in the late 1940s and 1950s, then South Korea in the 1960s. USAID, America’s aid agency, provided Jeeps for mobile clinics which roamed South Korea performing abortions. At one point, a quarter of the country’s health budget was going on population control and the number of abortions hit an all-time record in Seoul, where, in 1977, there were 2.75 abortions for every live birth. “What would have happened if the government hadn’t allowed for such easy abortion?” asks one sociologist. “I don’t think sex-selective abortion would have become so popular.”

Apropos of the above quote, from The Economist’s review of Mara Hvistendahl’s Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys Over Girls, and the Consequences of a World Full of Men (2011), let me present some government advertisements of the period to give you a better impression of that amazing zeal for population control back then.  More specifically, they also show that whereas couples were encouraged to have two children in the 1970s, and not to favor boys over girls, this would be reduced to only one child by the 1980s, and messages about the sex-ratio invariably diluted.

Obviously, these would come to play a huge role in today’s world-low birthrate, the difficulty many Korean men are now having in finding wives (although fortunately the sex-ratio among newborns has since been normalized), and the ensuing massive influx of overseas brides. Less obviously, they defy stereotypes about Koreans’ squeamishness when it comes to sexual matters, as I’ll explain.

But first, some context. All 30 or so advertisements I’ve been able to find were produced by the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (대한가족계획협회; now known as the Planned Population Federation of Korea {PPFK; 인구보선복지협회}) and/or the now defunct Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (보건사회부), and can be found here, here, here, and here, as well as (best) on the PPFK’s website.

Text, both calenders — Did you know that the most effective, safest, and simplest device is the loop (IUD)? People who want one, please go to a welfare or family planning center / Black headline, right calender — Let's have the proper number of babies, and raise them well!

Formed in April 1961 just before the coup, the PPFK would soon have the strong support of the military government. But according to Seungsook Moon in Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea (2005; pp. 81-2), its activities wouldn’t really take off until the 1970s, which possibly explains its rather uninspired efforts above (but note though, that the government itself was extremely active in population control well before then):

The modernizing state had to launch aggressive propaganda for family planning because the idea of contraception was foreign to most Koreans, who tended to believe that having many children meant good luck and that every child would bring his or her own food into the world….

….The state…worked closely with the PPFK to change the public perception of birth control, establishing a department of public relations in 1970 to make the idea and practice of contraception familiar to the populace. The PPFK increasingly relied on mass media (radio, television, newspapers, magazines and education texts of its own) to disseminate positive images and information about families with a small number of children. To encourage popular participation, the PPFK organized popular contests of various kinds, ranging from posters, songs, and slogans to stories of personal experiences by mothers and wives concerning contraception.

A fascinating book, it’s difficult not to quote much more here, as the next few pages make it clear that Korea’s population policies were just as systematic and draconian as China’s. In light of what is revealed in Hvistendahl’s more recent book though, it is strange that it doesn’t also discuss abortions, but it does mention that while IUDs insertions were offered freely in the 1960s (with the Marine Corps mobilized to provide them to isolated islanders), and considered the “patriotic” and “ideal” form of contraception (but with the pill also introduced in 1968 to alleviate their effects, in stark contrast to Japan), by the second half of the 1970s it would be female sterilization that was offered and aggressively applied, becoming “what can only be described as a sterilization mania” by the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1987, over 2 million Korean women would be sterilized, a “semiforced mass sterilization” that “led to abrupt reductions in the fertility rate and the rate of population growth in the 1980s” (p. 85).

Left, umbrella — The path to youth and beauty is family planning / Both posters — Don't discriminate between boys and girls, have only two children and raise them well (This slogan can be seen on many 1970s posters)

Left, headline — Which method is good?; cup — Family planning consultations; man, text — "I'll do it"; text, bottom — 1975 is International Women's Year / Right, 19th Family Weekly Magazine May 5-12 1974 — The World has One Destiny; NCC= The National Council of Churches in Korea (한국기독교교회협의회)

This poster on the left above is particularly interesting, and not just because that was the year that March 8 — which *cough* happens to be my birthday — was made International Women’s Day (alas, I was born a year later). Rather, it’s because of the guy saying “I’ll do it”, which couldn’t help but remind me of young Koreans’ surprising attitude that contraception is exclusively men’s responsibility (as indeed the Japanese think too). However, women were overwhemingly the focus of population control drives back then (Moon notes that only 1 vasectomy was performed for every 10 IUD insertions, although I think the ratio to female sterilizations would have been more useful), and women’s organizations co-opted or specifically created by the state to carry them out, so it seems anachronistic to see a connection between young Koreans’ attitudes today and those of their parents at the same age.

Indeed, this one on the left below turns out not to be about family-planning at all, but rather women’s rights (update: unfortunately, I’m having formatting problems sorry, so let me translate here instead):

Left, headline — We are all [the same] human; Man (clockwise from hat) — Family registry rights, parental rights, inheritance, children, estate; Text — Women’s Family Law Change Committee / Right, arrow — The path to a Gross National Income of of $1000 in 1981; Text, below — (Previous 1970s’ slogan)

Next, before moving on to posters from the 1980s, note that sterilization campaigns would come to be complimented by various economic incentives (p. 85):

In 1981, confronting negative economic growth for the first time since 1982, along with a decrease in the number of sterilization acceptors, the state issued “Countermeasures to Population Growth.” These measures were characterized by incentives to a family with one or two [James - ?] children; priority in getting housing loans and business loans, monetary support of low-income families, and free medical service for the first visit. During the 1980s, variations of these kinds of incentives were introduced almost every year.

Left — Two children is many too! / Right — Korea's population has already exceeded 40 million

And here are two posters with sons, and then two with daughters. But note that, confusedly, there were also some with two children like those in the 1970s though, and that clearly the government and PPFK were still very much concerned about the sex-ratio.

However, like I said that message was surely somewhat diluted by having some posters featuring and explicitly praising having a son, and it would be interesting to do a content analysis to determine the ratio of those that depicted sons to daughters, two children, or (preferably) a sex-neutral image like the eggs above:

Left — One family, full of love. One child, full of health / Right, headline — Because of one son; Text — Overpopulation is everybody's responsibility

Again, apologies for having formatting problems above:

Top — A blessing of one child, loved strongly / Bottom — Raise one daughter well, and you won’t envy [those who have] ten sons

Left, sign — Korea's current population: 40,524,837, Korea is overflowing; Text in map — Even if you only have one child, Korea is overflowing / Right — Korea is already overflowing

Finally, please note that these posters are just a handful of those available on the PPFK website, and which in turn must be a small sample of all that were produced. But in combination with what I’ve learnt from Militarized Modernity, they’ve still lead me to an interesting conclusion. Which is that, bearing in mind Koreans’ reputation for procrastination, yet doing things with outstanding zeal and efficiency once they set their minds to them (albeit usually precisely because of putting them off for so long), sexual matters are no exception, despite Koreans’ conservative reputation. Moreover, and intriguingly, it appears that young Korean couples of the 1970s and 1980s were likely to have been much better educated and informed than their children are now.

Assuming it does exist, what on Earth happened in the 1990s and 2000s to account for this curious generation gap? And why, even though technically adults rather than children were the target of government campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s, is sex education in Korea today so appalling?

(Source: unknown)

Last month, a reader emailed asking for help and information about in-vitro paternity testing, after his wife was raped and became pregnant while they were already trying to have a baby. With his permission, I’m very happy to pass on the following update:

…We got the test results back today and the baby is ours. We are naturally overjoyed.

If, god forbid, you get a similar question from a reader in the future, I can report that Paternity Testing Corporation (PTC), recommended by commenter Maria, came through for us. I would insist that a third party be a go-between between the victim and the company though (or at least the Japan branch) because they don’t seem to be used to dealing directly with victims, and can come across as insensitive. Also they’re not a travel agent, and people should make sure they know what clinic they’re going to and how to get there. We almost missed our chance to get the test done because we didn’t realize the clinic was actually in a neighboring province that took two hours to get to from Tokyo.

The strange thing is, the company says they are opening a branch soon in Seoul, after we were told several times that in-vitro paternity testing is completely forbidden in Korea. So I wonder if the roadblocks we were running into in Korea were more about the people not really knowing the answers to our questions and trying to save face.

Or maybe PTC will be focusing on paternity testing of young children and not doing any in-vitro testing. Who knows…

James — and later in his email, he again thanks Maria especially for directing his wife and him to PTC, and to all the other commenters for their help and support!

(“Pretend not to know”, “Pretend not to go”, “Pretend it’s the first time”. Push! Push! {1997}. Source)

This was the most read society news story on Naver last week, undoubtedly because of the recent announcement that the pill is to be made prescription only (a similar article was #5), which will naturally require more visits to OBGYNs. I have my own article about that coming out in Busan Haps next month (update: here it is!), but in the meantime see here, here and here for further details, as well as Korean Gender Reader posts from June.

Without discounting the genuine negative experiences outlined below, for the sake of balance let add that my wife has had no problems with those OBGYNs she’s dealt with since her first pregnancy, nor this 19 year-old student who wrote about her first visit to a clinic for her university newspaper (although it’s true she was given some strange and/or unnecessary tests). Also, it seems somewhat naive of patients to be surprised at questions about their sexual experience, and a little churlish of them to complain about them.

Update — in addition to many helpful, practical reader comments on this post below, and on the previous one about the student’s visit, let me recommend this one by a friend on Facebook:

…to be honest, I think most women expect a trip to the gyno to be awkward, that’s par for the course. However, many of the questions mentioned in the article were definitely way out of line. I’ve come across some less than sensitive (aka prejudiced and or judgmental) docs here.. I just assumed their overly-direct statements/questions were just a translation issue. Obviously not!

One disheartening aspect of women’s clinics is that you have to speak to a nurse (or sometimes just the receptionist) first, often in crowded reception area, to explain why you’re there. They often ask for all your symptoms, check your weight and blood pressure and when you had your last period in front of countless strangers. One clinic I went to had an LCD screen with the waiting patients listed in order of their turn.. including the reason why there were there… So much for privacy! It just adds another layer of humiliation to an already uncomfortable situation.

That being said- there are some amazing gynos here. I hope these problems can be properly addressed- no one should have to feel ashamed in front of their doctor. The danger here is that women will stop seeing doctors about their gynecological/sexual health out of fear of embarrassment and risk greater health problems.

“성경험 유무는 왜…? 굳이 그것까지” 굴욕의 진료, 산부인과

“Why do they ask about sexual experience? Is that really necessary?” Humiliating Treatment at OBGYN Clinics

엄지원 / Uhm Ji-won, The Hankyoreh, 2 July 2012

여성이 불편한 산부인과 / Women find gynecology clinics uncomfortable
접수대부터 진료·시술까지 / From reception to treatment and surgery
의료진 노골적 발언에 민망 / OBGYNs make suggestive, embarrassing comments
사전피임약 처방전 필요한데… / The pill requires a prescription…
여성들 심리적 부담 커 고민 / Psychological pressure on women increases
환자 배려 의료지침 등 필요 / OBGYNs need guidance on bedside manners

지난 6월 정부는 사전피임약을 전문약으로 분류하는 약사법 개정안을 발표했다. 이 법안이 국회에서 통과되면 여성들이 산부인과를 찾을 일이 더 많아질 수 있다. 이를 두고 여성들은 산부인과에 가는 것 자체가 눈치 보이는 사회 분위기를 지적한 바 있다.

This June, the government announced that it was considering amending the Drugs, Cosmetics, and Medical Instruments Law to reclassify the pill as a prescription medicine. If passed by Congress, it will mean women will have to visit OBGYN clinics much more often. In light of this, women have been pointing out the [bad] atmosphere at them.

한국여성민 우회가 산부인과 진료 경험이 있는 여성 210명을 상대로 설문조사한 결과는 ‘외부의 시선’ 못지않게 산부인과 진료 자체에 대한 여성들의 두려움이 실제로 광범위하게 퍼져 있다는 사실을 확인해준다. 설문 특성상 응답자의 신상과 구체적인 피해 일시·장소 등을 밝히진 않았지만, 여성들은 산부인과에서 겪은 수치와 불편을 설문지에 빼곡히 적었다.

Korean Womenlink conducted a survey of 210 women who had received treatment at OBGYN clinics, and the results confirmed not just the endurance of public stereotypes that all women visiting OBGYN clinics had STDs, but also that women’s fears in visiting them were well-founded. The survey was anonymous, and respondents were asked to provide no details of the times or places in which they’d been made to feel embarrassed or humiliated, but many still felt compelled to write a great deal about their negative experiences.

(Source)

신지은(가명·36)씨는 얼마 전 산부인과에서 느낀 굴욕감이 생생하다. 아이를 낳고 정기검진차 방문한 신씨에게 의사는 은근히 ‘수술’을 권했다.

Shin Ji-eun (not her real name), 36, vividly remembers visiting a clinic for a regular check-up after her child was born, where the doctor implied she should have surgery:

“출산을 한 뒤니 부부관계를 오래 유지하고 싶으면 이참에 수술을 하라”고 말했다. 그가 권한 것은 여성 성기를 성형하는 수술이었다. “배려인지 희롱인지 알 수 없는 제안”이었다고 신씨는 말했다.

“After having a baby, and seeing as you’re already here, you should have surgery on your genitals for the sake of your married life”, the doctor said [James - what kind of surgery isn’t specified]. “I didn’t know whether to take it as a joke or a serious suggestion” Ji-eun said.

실제로 설문조사에 응한 여성들은 진료가 시작되는 접수대에서부터 낙태경험 또는 성경험을 묻는 수치스런 질문을 받았다고 증언했다. 어느 여성은 “진료 접수 때 ‘냉이 많아져서 병원에 왔다’고 했더니, 접수대 간호사가 큰 소리로 ‘성병이네요’라고 말해 매우 불쾌했다”고 적었다.

Respondents to the survey reported being asked embarrassing questions about their sexual experience and having abortions even as soon as arriving at the reception desk. One woman said “I went to the OBGYN clinic because I was having a heavy vaginal discharge, and the nurse at the desk loudly said ‘Oh, you must have an STD!’, which mortified me.”

진료 시작 뒤에도 수치심을 주는 의료진의 발언이 이어졌다고 응답자들은 적었다. 특히 “성경험이 있느냐”고 묻는 의료진의 태도가 당혹스러웠다고 여성들은 밝혔다. 어느 여성은 “성경험이 없다”고 답했다가 “검사할 때 번거롭다. 솔직히 말하라”는 의사의 말을 들었다. “그 뒤로 가급적 산부인과에 가지 않는다”고 이 여성은 밝혔다.

The shaming experiences continue after treatment starts too, because of doctors’ comments. In particular, after being asked if she had sexual experience, and replying that she didn’t, one woman found her doctor’s reply – “Be honest. Otherwise the examination will be more complicated” – perplexing, and said she’d rather not visit an OBGYN again.

(Source)

의료진이 성경험 여부를 묻는 것은 관련 진료에 필수적인 정보이기 때문이다. 그러나 성경험이 있든 없든 “왜 그런 정보가 필요한지 사전 설명 없이 다짜고짜 물어 불쾌했다”는 게 처음 산부인과를 방문한 여성들의 이구동성이다. 여성민우회 조사를 보면, 산부인과 방문 당시 성경험이 있었던 경우는 69.5％, 없었던 경우는 29.5％였다.

Before being treated, patients need an explanation of why being asked about their sexual experience was necessary. Without that, many women reported, they felt very embarrassed on their first visits to clinics.

Of the respondents, 69.5% had prior sexual experience, and 29.5% didn’t.

Top Left — Of 210 Respondents: 35.2% had no negative experiences, 64.3% did, and 0.5% didn’t reply.

Top Right — Of the 64.3% of women who reported negative experiences: 56.3% were related to fears and anxieties about their treatment; 30.4% to public perceptions [of OBGYN patients]; 3.7%  to questions about STDs; 3.0% to costs of treatment; and 6.7% to other things.

Bottom — Age at first visit to an OBGYN

자궁경부암 검사를 받으러 갔던 어느 여성은 “결혼 안 했으면 처녀막이 상할 수 있으니 검사하지 말라”는 의사의 말을 들었다. 자신을 배려하는 듯하면서도 ‘처녀성’ 운운하는 발언에 수치심을 느꼈다고 응답자는 적었다. “몇번 경험해봤나”, “최근엔 언제였나”, “첫 경험이 언제인가”, “남자친구 말고 섹스 파트너가 있나” 등을 아무렇지 않게 묻는 일은 점잖은 축에 속했다. 이들이 기록한 의료진의 어떤 발언은 그대로 옮기기에 민망할 정도다.

One woman who visited in order to be examined for cervical cancer was asked if she was married, “because if you haven’t, then you shouldn’t receive an examination that will break your hymen”; while possibly the doctor was just being considerate about her virginity, the woman still felt ashamed and embarrassed. Other embarrassing questions, like “How many times have you had sex?”; “When was the last time you had sex?”; “When did you lose your virginity?”; and “Do you have another partner in addition to your boyfriend”, don’t even begin to compare to what some doctors asked patients, which they reported were too shameful to write down in their surveys (source, right).

“성기 모양이 참 예쁘다. 남편이 함부로 하지 않는가 보다.” “가슴이 작아서 사진이 찍히려나 모르겠네.” “어린데 왜 산부인과에 왔을까?” 심지어 체모가 많은 것을 보고 “남편이 좋아했겠다”는 이야기를 들은 경우도 있었다.

“Your vagina is very pretty. Your husband wasn’t as rough as most men”; “Your breasts are so small I’m not sure they will even show in the mammogram”; ” You’re so young, why are you visiting an OBGYN?” and even, after seeing that a patient had lots of pubic hair, commenting that “Your husband must like it” are among some of the stories about doctors that respondents did provide.

환자보다 의사 중심으로 꾸며진 진료 환경에 대한 여성들의 성토도 이어졌다.

In general, respondents felt that the treatment environment was designed with doctors rather than patients in mind.

다리를 위로 향한 채 눕게 돼 있는 산부인과의 ‘진료의자’를 응답자들은 ‘굴욕의자’, ‘쩍벌의자’로 부르며 불쾌감을 표시했다. 한 여성은 “진찰대에 다리를 벌리고 올라가는 것 자체가 매우 불쾌해 다시 가고 싶지 않다”고 적었다.

(Source)

Women showed how upset they were by describing the treatment chair, in which patients lie with their legs in stirrups, as the “Chair of Shame”, or the “Spreadeagle Chair”. One woman wrote “I never want to go in that chair again. Having to spread my legs like that is very upsetting.”

자궁암 검사를 위해 병원을 찾았던 여성은 “의사가 들어오기 전 속옷을 벗고 다리를 벌린 채 준비했고 뒤이어 들어온 의사는 아무 설명도 없이 진료도구를 질 내부에 집어넣어 검사했다”고 불쾌감을 드러냈다.

Another woman who went to a hospital to be checked for cervical cancer wrote “Before the doctor came, I took off my underwear and got up and spread my legs, and when he arrived he just quickly put an instrument inside me, without any warning or explanation.”

‘진정으로 산부인과를 걱정하는 의사들 모임’의 최안나 대변인은 “산부인과 진료는 특히 예민한 분야이므로 성경험 여부 등 구체 정보가 왜 필요한지, 진료 과정은 어떻게 진행될 것인지 상세히 설명하고 의견을 구하는 건 당연한 절차”라며 “산부인과의 진료 서비스가 많이 나아지고 있다고 해도 여전히 일부 환자 눈높이에 부족한 점이 있다”고 말했다.

Choi Ahn-na, a spokesperson for the Korean Gynecological Physicians’ Association (GYNOB) [James — a notoriously anti-abortion group of OBGYNs. See here for more information about them] explained that “Gynecology and Obstetrics are very sensitive branches of medicine, for which it is both normal and essential for OBGYNs to have detailed information about patients, as this determines both the treatment type and how it’s administered. However, while OBGYNs have improved their services a great deal, it is also true that remaining weak spots need to be dealt with, as well as how things looks from patients’ perspectives.”

(Source)

여성민우회는 이달 중 1000여명에 대한 실태조사 최종 결과 분석이 끝나면 전문의·보건전문가 등과 간담회를 열어 환자를 배려하는 산부인과 의료 지침을 만들어 배포하는 등 ‘산부인과 바꾸기 프로젝트’를 이어갈 계획이다.

Continuing its “Transform OBGYN Clinics Project” [James — Yes, this is the first time it's been mentioned in the article], this month Womenlink is following-up by surveying 1000 women. After analyzing the results with health specialists, it will produce and distribute a guide for OBGYNs for dealing with patients.

김인숙 한국여성민우회 공동대표는 “왜 여성들이 산부인과에 가는 데 부담감을 느끼는지 구체적으로 확인해 앞으로 더 나은 산부인과 진료 문화를 만들어 갈 것”이라고 밝혔다.

Kim In-sook, a co-spokesperson of Womenlink, said “We will determine exactly why women feel so stressed about going to clinics, with the aim of making a better and more welcoming environment for them there.”

<한겨레>는 ‘여성이 불편한 산부인과’를 ‘여성이 행복한 산부인과’로 바꾸기 위한 제보와 의견을 받아 관련 보도를 이어갈 예정이다.

(Editor): In order to make women feel comfortable with visiting OBGYN clinics, The Hankyoreh will continue to receive and report on women’s opinions and experiences of them.

Today, some information about two very worthy causes.

First, on ongoing volunteer opportunities for the Korean Unwed Mothers’ Families Association in Daegu and the 3rd Single Moms’ Day Conference this May. Then, on a Kickstarter campaign for a full length documentary film seeking to help preserve and spread knowledge of the shamanistic practices and shrine religion of Jeju Island:

I. The Korean Unwed Mothers’ Families Association (KUMFA) is an organization that works to promote children’s human rights while addressing systemic discrimination. KUMFA advocates for the human rights of unwed pregnant women, unwed mothers and their children in Korea. KUMFA’s goal is to enable Korean women to have sufficient resources and support to keep their babies if they choose, and thrive in Korean society.

More information is available in the following interview and at the Single Moms’ Day event page:

Daegu KUMFA Volunteer Opportunities (ongoing):

The Daegu Branch of the Korean Unwed Mothers’ Families Association will hold meetings and provide classes for their members. KUMFA Daegu seeks volunteers to provide childcare during the classes. In the future other types of volunteer opportunities may arise. For additional details please visit the KUMFA Facebook Page or contact us directly at kumfa.volunteer@gmail dot com.

Seoul KUMFA Volunteer Opportunities (ongoing):

The Seoul Branch of Korean Unwed Mothers’ Families Association has ongoing volunteer and learning opportunities. Sign up by joining the Facebook group.

II. Seoul Conference (May 10-11, 2013): The 3rd Single Moms’ Day Conference:

SMD advocates for human rights in a number of important ways, in particularly by addressing systemic discrimination by “informing people inside and outside Korea about the factors that pressure unwed mothers to relinquish their children for adoption. Push factors include fathers’ child support obligations being unenforced; lack of adequate social welfare from the Korean government; social discrimination against unwed mothers and their children. Pull factors include the fact that more than half of unwed mothers in facilities are living in unwed mothers’ shelters that are owned and operated by adoption agencies; a money-driven international adoption system that does not conform to the UN CRC or the Hague Convention, i.e., it does not respect children’s humans rights.”

For more information or to make a donation, please visit the SMD event page. Here is some volunteer testimony:

“I have been involved with SMD and related projects for two years. I’ve learned a lot from this really inspiring collaboration of groups that fight for Korean children’s human rights, including: parents whose children were adopted by unethical means; unwed parents who are fighting workplace and social discrimination to raise their children; adult adoptees who campaign for ethical reforms to adoption laws; supporters and volunteers who work to bring policies into the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.”

Next, on Jeju Documentarian Giuseppe Rositano’s Kickstarter campaign. Please do check the link for additional information, and on why your help is needed:

As a popular tourist destination in South Korea, Jeju Island has risen to fame predominantly for its natural wonders: hiking trails in abundance, scenic ocean views and South Korea’s highest mountain. It is possible to experience these in just a few short days, but staying on the island a bit longer or even making it a home provides the opportunities to get a deeper understanding and appreciation of some of the more interesting aspects of Jeju. Documentarian Giuseppe Rositano, Jeju Island resident of 7 years, explores some of these more interesting aspects of Jeju life, specifically the shamanistic beliefs and shrine religion of Jeju Island that is in danger due to the rapidly declining population of believers.

Spanning the course of 18 months and accumulating more than 500 hours of shamanistic ceremonies and traditional storytelling on film, Rositano captures the spiritual life of 5 villages through exploration of their native deities and traditional oral stories that have been passed down through generations. These stories, which describe the lives of Jeju’s extensive pantheon, are quickly disappearing. At Search is an attempt to preserve these unique indigenous beliefs.

Each village on Jeju Island has several shrines in which local deities specific to the island are ‘seated’. Each of these deities corresponds to a ‘bonpuli’ or oral myth. With an adventurous spirit, this documentary sets out to capture the retelling of these ‘bonpuli’ legends in the voice of what is likely the final generation of elders who received the stories from their parents and grandparents. Sadly, younger generations are seldom aware of these stories which serve as the cornerstones for their grandparents’ spiritual lives and cultural identity. With over 400 shrines on the island and a total of 18,000 gods on Jeju, that’s quite a loss to humanity’s cultural history!

Currently At Search for Spirits on the Island of Rocks, Wind and Women is in post-production. Rositano and team have launched a kickstarter campaign to raise funds to bring the project to completion and to get it out to film festivals around the world.

(Source: J. David Allen)

A snapshot of some of the different forms of sexual discrimination experienced at Korean workplaces, from the January 15 edition of Metro Busan:

Women Workers’ “Promotion Grief” is Big

71% Say “Compared to Men, Promotions Come Late and with Limits”…54% Say “We Feel Inhibited From Asking for Maternity Leave”

A survey of women workers has revealed that when it comes to promotion, they still feel that they suffer from sexual discrimination.

The results of a survey of 1623 women workers by job portal site JobKorea, released on the 14th, showed that 71.4% believed that the promotion systems at their companies placed women at a disadvantage.

Asked for more information about this discrimination, 40.4% [of the 1623 women] said that “compared to men that enter the company at the same time, women have to wait longer to get promoted,” and 38.3% added that “women are excluded from some higher positions.”

In addition, 35.9% mentioned that “if we take maternity leave or time off before and after giving birth, we get lower scores on our evaluations by the personnel department,” 29% that “even if we have the same ability and practical know-how as men, we get lower scores,” and 21.8% that women simply are excluded from certain kinds of jobs.

Also, 54.7% replied that they found it very difficult to ask their superiors or coworkers for time off for childbirth, 15.8% said that they felt pressure to quit their jobs after having a baby, and finally 8.6% were aware of cases where recent mothers were indeed forced to quit. (end)

With no information given about the methodology used, then all those results should be taken with a grain of salt unfortunately.

In particular, considering that it is still common practice to fire women upon marriage, then that last figure sounds rather low to me. Also, consider that before the current economic crisis, not only did Korea already have one of the lowest women’s workforce participation rates (and the highest wage gap) in the OECD, but that those few that did work formed a disproportionate number of irregular workers. This ensured that they would be laid-off en masse last year (see #15 here also), and they are unlikely to return to work soon given Korea’s jobless recovery.

(In stark contrast, the decline in the construction industry in the US, for instance, means that for the first time in history actually more women work than men there now.)

Meanwhile, the effects of all the above on Korea’s low birthrate have also been somewhat predictable, now the world’s lowest for the third year running. But never fear, for the Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO) is on the case:

(See here {Korean} for more on the making of the campaign)

In KOBACO’s defense, the first women featured does actually have a job. Is it churlish of me to point out that she still goes home early to cook while her husband burns the midnight oil…?

Update 1: Lest the commercial not succeed though, then the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (보건복지가족부), in charge of raising the country’s birthrate, is insisting that its employees go home at 7:30 pm on the third Wednesday of each month, all the better to have sex with their partners and have more babies.

No, unfortunately I’m not making that up.

Update 2: This satire of that is so good, it’s difficult not to believe that it’s the real thing!